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By saying that we live in an activist state, I mean to mark a special
feature of our self-consciousness: an awareness that our society's existence
depends upon a continuing flow of decisions made by politically accounta-
ble state officials. The sources of this activist consciousness are several.
Most obvious is the general recognition that our society's continued exis-
tence depends upon the military sanity of its political leadership. Second,
and only slightly less pervasive, is the belief that the nation's economic
welfare depends upon steering decisions made in Washington, D.C.-both
at the macroeconomic level and through the regulation of particular sec-
tors of economic life.' Finally, there is the widespread acknowledgment
that the distribution of wealth and status is a central issue for political
debate determination. Poverty, racism, and sexism are not inexorable giv-
ens; they are the consequences of systematic practices in which state offi-
cials are self-consciously involved, from the moment at which they grant
or deny an impoverished mother a free abortion to the moment at which
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Medicare sustains, or fails to sustain, the last efforts to prolong life.
It is within this context of social perception-a context that gained its
historical reality during the administration of Franklin Roosevelt-that I
mean to situate the evolving legal culture. In looking back upon the New
Deal, I will not attempt an appraisal of the substantive merits of any of
its particular initiatives. Instead, I shall consider whether, after fifty years
of arguing out the particular meanings of bits and pieces of activist law,
lawyers can begin to see larger patterns in the professional effort to make
sense out of our existing legal situation. This exercise will suggest that the
transformation of legal discourse engendered by the New Deal is deeper
than one might initially suppose. Not only has the rise of the activist state
forced lawyers to argue about new fact-patterns; it is also leading them to
revise the very pattern of a professionally competent "statement of the
facts." Not only has the profession been obliged to recognize the legiti-
macy of new values; lawyers are also beginning to conceive the very na-
ture of value controversy in a new way.
While cultural diffusion is a complex and uneven affair, the new forms
of factual description and normative evaluation are slowly becoming fa-
miliar to larger groups within the profession. Talk of market failure and
externality, Pareto-efficiency and Rawlsian-maximin, is no longer dis-
missed as hopelessly idiosyncratic. When arguments invoking these and
other such notions are now introduced into legal conversation, some of the
participants have heard similar-sounding talk before, and others are
vaguely aware that such rhetorical maneuvers have been used elsewhere to
win arguments before administrative agencies, or legislatures, or courts.
Although most of the bits and pieces of the new rhetoric originated in
universities, I shall not be treating them as if they were an odd set of
trendy topics in law, economics, philosophy, and other esoteric disciplines.
Instead, what we are witnessing is the birth of a distinctive form of legal
discourse: a professionally stabilized rhetoric that increasing numbers of
lawyers will be obliged to master if they hope to translate their clients'
grievances into a language that power-holders will find persuasive; a new
language of power, premised on a distinctive set of attitudes toward fact
and value, that I shall call Legal Constructivism.
I do not expect this birth announcement to excite general jubilation.
The propagation of a new language of power cannot fail to be a traumatic
event for a profession whose stock-in-trade is persuasive argument. Most
obviously, the new form of law-talk threatens countless lawyers with the
risk of professional obsolescence. More insidiously, the new discourse
poses a threat to the profession as a whole: Does not the very effort to talk
law in a different way suggest some deep disappointment with the old
way of doing justice? These dangers to lawyerly self-esteem will provoke
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endless efforts at professional reassurance. The new law-talk will be con-
tinually exposed as a sham and repeatedly condemned as immoral. Partic-
ularly crude and insensitive applications of the new learning will be
greeted with poorly concealed delight by lawyers who wish to dismiss the
movement as aberrational and thereby avoid the need for the analytic re-
tooling it seems to demand.
The transparent obscurantism of many of the critics, however, should
not obscure their challenge to my claim that there is something in all this
smoke of legal disputation to be fired up about. And so it will be my first
task to induce you to suspend the disbelief naturally provoked by my the-
sis and explain why our legal generation has been challenged by history to
engage in a rare act of collective creation: to construct a new language of
power that does justice to the aspirations for justice of our fellow citizens.
This will require a rather abstract discussion of the way in which the
legitimation of an activist state fundamentally reshapes the lawyer's con-
versational agenda, forcing the profession to address new questions in a
new way within a changing institutional setting (Part I). It is only then
that we can gain a larger perspective upon some of the more prominent
Constructions already put in place by the pioneers of the last generation
(Part II). These individual achievements, I hope to persuade you, add up
to a whole that is larger than the sum of its parts. Rather than providing
one or another isolated insight, they are enabling lawyers to carry on a
disciplined conversation about facts (Part III) and values (Part IV) in a
way that is responsive to the distinctive demands imposed upon legal dis-
course by the rise of an activist state. Indeed, once one exposes the activist
character of the new language of power, it will become plain that the
pioneering Constructions of the past are very primitive indeed, and that if
the profession is to make the most of its new conversational resources, it
will have to build Constructions of a kind that some of the most notable
pioneers would have hated to live in.
I. Forms of Law-Talk
Why, then, is it even plausible to suppose that the rise of an activist
state would engender a fundamental transformation in the character of
legal discourse?
To answer this question, we first require a clear conception of the lim-
ited kinds of legal argument possible in a polity untainted by activist
ideas. For euphony, I will call such a place the purely reactive state. Hav-
ing established this conceptual baseline, we can then systematically inves-
tigate the conversational consequences of repudiating reactive political
premises and replacing them with activist political principles.
To forestall predictable misunderstanding, I must emphasize that my
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reactive and activist models are not to be read as pop-historical cartoons of
the American legal past. There has never been, nor will there ever be, a
time in American history when all legal conversation can be organized by
a single discursive model.2 The point of the models is not to serve as bits
of bad history, but to alert us to a present possibility: that the activist
dimension of our legal discourse has, fifty years after the New Deal,
reached a critical stage in its practical importance and theoretical
development.
A. Reactive Lawyering
Imagine what the practice of law would look like in a purely reactive
state. In such a hypothetical polity, the military, economic, and social
foundations of daily life are not conceived as raising questions of self-
conscious and systematic political decision. Instead, the "invisible hand" is
allowed to govern such matters. Military defense is left to the oceans,
economic welfare to the market-place, social justice to whatever-
emerges-from-the-millions-of-free-decisions-made-each-day-by-counless-
Americans.
For the present, I am entirely uninterested in exploring the merits of
these (familiar) views. Instead, my aim is to emphasize the way the reac-
tive state's systematic political allegiance to the invisible hand constrains
the conversational moves open to lawyers trying to translate the grievances
of their clients into legally persuasive arguments. On this level, the impli-
cations are obvious enough. Legal argument is restricted by something I
shall call the "reactive constraint":
No legal argument shall be acceptable if it requires the lawyer to
question the legitimacy of the military, economic, and social arrange-
ments generated by the invisible hand.
Although this conversational constraint is of a purely negative kind, it
gives a definite shape to the reactive professional culture. While the con-
straint.forbids lawyers from questioning the invisible hand, it imposes no
similar bar upon lawyerly efforts to glorify the social expectations gener-
ated by existing social practices. There are, in particular, five features of
the ensuing lawyerly exchange that may be usefully emphasized.
First, the legal conversation deals with the appraisal of particular ac-
tions against the background of ongoing social practice; thanks to the reac-
tive constraint, the legitimacy of an entire practice is never open to frontal
2. For a more extensive discussion of the different uses of discursive models, see Ackerman, Four
Questions for Legal Theory, 22 NOMOS 351 (1980).
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legal challenge. Of course, prevailing practice may change over time, and
so the appraisal of particular actions may change as well, but these slow
changes in social practice are conceived by the legal disputants as exoge-
nous to the self-conscious decisions made within the legal culture. So far
as lawyers are concerned, the only thing worth talking about is the partic-
ular trouble generated by the actions of particular people at a particular
time. The cumulative impact of these decisions upon the ebb and flow of
institutional life is something that no reactive lawyer would discuss in a
professionally disciplined fashion before a legally authoritative tribunal.
This leads directly to a second defining feature. So far as the law is
concerned, the only decisive question is whether the challenged action
deviates from institutionalized norms. Each lawyer tries to provide a per-
suasive account of ongoing practice that makes the opponent's conduct ap-
pear deviant, and his own client's behavior, innocent, justifiable, or, at the
very least, excusable.
Given this focus on the deviance of particular actions, it follows, third,
that the original disputants are typically in the best position to develop the
facts and values relevant to a just decision. Their particular actions, after
all, generated the dispute in the first place, and so they should be in a
good position to organize the presentation of the relevant evidence. Simi-
larly, as well-socialized citizens, good lawyers are familiar with the pre-
vailing social practices that serve as the source of governing norms. While
opposing advocates will, of course, interpret established expectations in a
way that puts their clients' actions in the most favorable light, reactive
decisionmakers have no reason to expect that advocates will ignore any
factors relevant to a mature appraisal of deviance.
Indeed, under proper guidance from an official, there is no reason why
a jury of laymen cannot make the ultimate decision about deviance. In-
deed, the jury trial may well serve as the paradigmatic example of popu-
lar participation in, and control over, the legal system. In contrast, even a
popularly responsive legislature is viewed with suspicion.' No system of
legislative rules can hope to reflect the complex web of principles well-
socialized people use to elaborate the structure of institutionalized expec-
tation. The very effort at codification bespeaks intellectual arrogance:
Why try to lay down rules when a jury of laymen can deploy its subtle
common sense in an individualized appraisal? Moreover, even a relatively
successful code will soon become obsolete as expectations evolve under the
benign guidance of the invisible hand. The mere fact that the legislature is
democratically elected should not permit it to go on arrogant and unwise
3. For a particularly extreme statement, see J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCEs OF THE LAW
170-73 (rev. ed. 1921).
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lawmaking escapades. For the jury is also a democratic institution and
better adapted to handle the central problems of reactive lawmaking.
Rather than framing comprehensive codes, legislators should be modest in
their ambitions, addressing well-defined problems that somehow escape
the ken of the case-oriented jury. Call this fourth feature of the reactive
model: the dominance of lay adjudication over popular legislation.
Finally, while the effort to define deviance may involve a host of com-
plex contextual arguments, the legal conversation will have a natural end.
There is only so much that can be said about particular actions before the
conversation gets repetitive. The only thing left to do is for the jury to
engage in a densely textured judgment upon the defendant's con-
duct-either it was deviant or it was not. If it was, the defendant should
set things right; if not, not. Next case.
B. Activist Lawyering
Now assume that, for one reason or another, the dominant opinion
among the citizenry no longer holds that the country's military, economic,
and social problems can take care of themselves without self-conscious
tending. Assume, further, that the citizenry insists that law and lawyers
have a central role to play in activist governance. Consider, then, how
these simple changes will transform the profession's conversational
repertoire.
Most obviously, the subject of legal conversation will no longer be lim-
ited to the appraisal of individual actions against the background of pre-
sumptively legitimate social practice. At least some of the time, the ongo-
ing practice itself will be the source of the legal challenge. While the
reactive lawyer is exclusively concerned with determining individual devi-
ance, the activist lawyer is also concerned with identifying actions that
seem innocent but require modification if the entire system is to function
acceptably. What could be more innocent than a society at peace, happily
minding its own business-except when a hostile enemy threatens? What
could be more innocent than selling a good at a price the buyer is willing
to pay-except when free markets, left unregulated, generate systemati-
cally inefficient and unjust results? What could be more innocent than
flushing a toilet-except when a billion daily flushes destroy a precious
ecosystem?
Such problems require a radical revision in the ways lawyers talk.
First, the activist lawyer will require a new way of describing the relevant
facts. It would be incredibly time-consuming, for example, to describe the
practice of auto-driving by reporting that Roe drove from A to B, Doe
drove from C to D, and so on. It would also miss the point of activist
concern, which is to assess the extent to which the practice, considered as
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a whole, requires self-conscious legal regulation if it is to operate in an
acceptable fashion. To discharge this function, the lawyer must somehow
develop a structural statement of the facts that reveals the ways an activity
might be feasibly reorganized to avoid or ameliorate the inefficiencies and
injustices it may be generating. If lawyers are successful in producing
such an account, moreover, their very triumph will serve to push them
ever deeper into the structural enterprise. For it will quickly become obvi-
ous that the regulation of one activity-say, auto-driving-will have an
important impact on the way other activities-walking, breathing, and the
like-are organized. Should we not, then, try to understand these impor-
tant "second-order effects" by embedding the initial description into a
more comprehensive structural account?
In practice, of course, this quest for ever-broader understanding must
be kept under reasonable control, lest it delay necessary decisions in a
continually expanding and pointlessly expensive fact-finding spiral. In
principle, however, the activist lawyer has no objection to the selective
investigation of second-order effects-and is likely to develop lore defining
the occasions, and institutional contexts, in which such explorations are
worthwhile. In contrast, the very notion of a disciplined assessment of sec-
ond-order effects is alien to the reactive lawyer's frame of reference. The
reactive objective is to do justice to the very particular facts of the dispute
demanding resolution, rather than waste precious time on idle speculation.
If a series of particular decisions yields untoward results, the consequences
will be considered whenever "any visible inconvenience doth appear."4
From an activist perspective, this cavalier attitude toward the future
does not merely generate avoidable hardship; its self-confident assertion of
future reactive prowess is often unjustified. Given the high costs of litiga-
tion and legislative lobbying, many systemic "inconveniences" may never
appear in a way that is "visible" to reactive decisionmakers, because the
injured parties may lack the money, energy, and organizational incentives
to force their grievances onto the reactive agenda.5 The refusal to interpret
particular facts in light of their social and economic context seems guaran-
teed, in the end, to achieve only one objective: to blind the reactive lawyer
to the very existence of the systemic failures that motivate activist
concerns.
The activist's structural statement of the facts, moreover, only serves as
a prologue to a continuing disagreement over the proper shape of legal
4. The dictum is from Lord Nottingham's judgment in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 49
(1682).
5. See, e.g., Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of
Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 13? (1980); Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974); Priest, Selective Characteristics of
Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980).
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conversation. Having rejected the reactive preoccupation with the elabo-
rate description of particular actions, the activist is now in a position to
challenge a second defining feature of the reactive model: its concern with
the extent to which challenged actions offend institutionalized expecta-
tions. The reactive lawyer's search for individual deviance will begin to
seem patently myopic, often leading to a pernicious kind of scapegoating
in which an individual actor is wrongly held responsible for the inade-
quate workings of the invisible hand. The proper place to begin the nor-
mative argument is not with assertions of individual deviance but with the
reasons the existing practice, considered as a whole, may be considered
inefficient or unjust. Once viewed in this systemic way, it will rarely seem
plausible to see an entire practice as deviant. Car-driving, for example,
does make breathing and walking more difficult, but this does not suggest
that we should all walk to work; market exchange may well exacerbate
many kinds of social injustice, but this hardly implies the desirability of
suppressing all markets. Instead, the activist legal task is to design a better
form of accommodation between competing activities than the one thrown
up by the invisible hand.
If they are to hope for a reasoned effort at such an accommodation,
activist lawyers will have to deal with values far more abstractly than
their reactive counterparts. Rather than appraising individual actions
against the background of concrete social practice, they must learn to as-
sess the extent to which concrete practice conforms to the social ideals
affirmed by prevailing activist legal principles. For reactive advocates, in
contrast, such an abstract normative inquiry forces lawyers beyond their
proper role into the vagaries of social engineering, and is fated to tragic
failure.
It is a serious mistake, however, to take reactive prophecies of doom at
face value. While an explicit concern with the legitimacy of social struc-
tures does set activist lawyers apart, it does not commit them to call for an
ever-deeper penetration by government officials into ongoing social life.
Insofar as they live in a liberal state, activist lawyers will be constantly
emphasizing the risk that heavy-handed intervention can become counter-
productive, illegitimate, or both. In addition, an ongoing concern with de-
regulation will seem a vital component of the activist enterprise: It is only
by eliminating misbegotten or obsolescent initiatives that we may project
the polity's energies into those areas where focused intervention will en-
hance, rather than diminish, the exercise of individual rights and the
quality of collective life. Activist value-talk, in short, is entirely consistent
with a strong commitment to limited government. Indeed, so far as the
activist is concerned, it provides the best way of assuring that govern-
ment's limited energies will not be exhausted in wrongheaded scapegoat-
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ing and empty gestures.
The new kinds of structural description and evaluation challenge, in
turn, the third feature of the reactive model: Parties to particular disputes
can no longer be relied upon to present all the relevant facts, articulate all
the relevant values. Their particular controversy may be atypical and cre-
ate a misleading impression of the problems experienced by most partici-
pants in the practice under scrutiny. It follows that the particular argu-
ments advanced by the primary disputants may properly be complemented
by others proffered by a bureaucracy concerned with the "public interest"
or by lawyers engaged to represent those groups who would otherwise be
unrepresented. Moreover, the ultimate decisionmaker will often have
cause to be dissatisfied with the state of the record tendered to him, some
critical dimension of the dispute having been ignored by the parties who
happen to be participating in the decision. In such a case, the activist
decisionmaker may well be given the right to express his dissatisfaction in
a way that would surprise his reactive counterpart. He might, for exam-
ple, be allowed to go beyond the record to take notice of important data or
force the parties to respond to issues they have ignored. Litigation is no
longer conceived as a bipolar dispute about deviance controlled by a small
number of private parties. The activist lawsuit is, in principle, expandable
into a polycentric dispute6 in which the decisionmaker may take an af-
firmative role in defining the relevant facts and values the parties are to
explore.
Within this context, the primacy of lay adjudication falls under a cloud.
At the very least, untrained jurors cannot be trusted to detect the occasions
on which the parties have ignored critical dimensions of the necessary
structural description. If they are not to be displaced by expert fact-
finders, it is only because other (abstract) values justify their continuing
participation in activist policymaking. Most notably, the case for jury in-
volvement will increasingly be seen to rest upon its capacity to check the
tyrannical abuse of official power by an overweening bureaucracy.7 Even
here, however, lay adjudication will not be endowed with quite the same
paradigmatic significance it commands within the reactive interpretation
of the legal world. Rather than glorifying jury trial, the activist lawyer
6. I owe the term, and much else besides, to Lon Fuller's seminal essay, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 395-401 (1978). For more particular insights into the character
of the activist judicial process, I am also greatly indebted to the work of Abram Chayes, Owen Fiss,
and Martin Shapiro. See M. SHAPIRO, COURTS 1-64 (1981); Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981
Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
7. For particularly thoughtful assessments of the modern jury, see M. KADISH & S. KADISH,
DISCRETION TO DISOBEY (1973); G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 57-72 (1978).
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will now look to the legislature as the preeminent forum for the expres-
sion of the popular will. This is where the People speak, through their
politically responsible agents, about the best ways to revise existing social
practices. It is the lawyer's task to incorporate these new messages into the
ongoing scheme of activist governance, as well as to alert the People to
basic issues that seem to require their focused attention. The fourth fea-
ture of our activist model, then, emphasizes the democratic primacy of
popular legislation over lay adjudication. The lawyer's ultimate appeal is
no longer to a random audience of twelve laymen, but to a carefully se-
lected group of full-time political representatives, aided by a proliferating
group of professionally trained assistants.
It should be plain, fifth, that this legal conversation has no end. The
People must be constantly apprised of new tensions arising in the activist
effort to govern an immense variety of competing activities. Indeed, the
questions of principle and policy raised by activist governance overwhelm
the time and energy of the small number of elected representatives who
speak in the People's name. The lawmaking functions of administrative
agencies no longer seem a peripheral matter; instead the quality of deci-
sionmaking in these institutions is a prime question of legal concern.' Not
only is there a deepening interest in the way statutes shape bureaucratic
incentives, but there is also a demand for review procedures that can reli-
ably test bureaucratic actions to assure that structural fact-finding and
agency lawmaking are consistent with activist legal principles.
While these review proceedings may be channelled into specialized new
tribunals or remitted to more traditional courts, they will everywhere tend
to erode principles of finality familiar to reactive lawyers. Although reac-
tive lawsuits come to a natural end when the deviants are forced to repay
their debt to those they have aggrieved, the activist lawsuit is but a chap-
ter in a never-ending story of the polity's struggle with an ongoing prob-
lem. Particular chapter-endings will, of course, have a special importance
for the particular litigants, who may walk away from their lawsuit with a
"final judgment" on their particular dispute. Even these final judgments
may be reopened, however, with an ease that would surprise a reactive
lawyer. For it is always possible that the abstract values served by finality
may be outweighed, in a particular case, by changing structural facts and
emerging legal values. A final judgment no longer suggests that everything
worth saying has been said, but rather that it is best, all things considered,
to say no more at a particular time.
Yet, while the unending work of structural appraisal and reappraisal is
8. See P. SOHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983);
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
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going on, citizens must face up to the fact that they each have only one life
to live; and that, unless they choose the path of revolution, they must con-
form their conduct to the expectations generated by existing social institu-
tions. This perception, in turn, motivates the last element of my model of
activist discourse. It allows us to find a new place for the traditional skills
and modalities of reactive lawyering. Although activist citizens no longer
look upon social institutions as the natural consequences of the invisible
hand, they believe that they often have a right to rely upon the expecta-
tions generated by social practices unless and until they are revised
through legal process. Thus, when somebody violates existing expecta-
tions, the injured party will often see a point in hiring a lawyer to charge
the adversary with a wrongful deviation from an established practice in
the familiar reactive manner.
Nonetheless, the rise of the activist state potentially transforms the na-
ture of the humblest suit in tort, property, or contract. While, in a purely
reactive state, the only question these lawsuits explicitly raise is the extent
to which one side or the other deviated from expectations fairly derived
from ongoing practice, the fall of the reactive constraint makes it possible
for one or another side to attempt a new conversational turn. Rather than
justifying a claim in terms of existing practice, a lawyer may seek to per-
suade the court that such a practice does not deserve state support in the
light of the law's ongoing pursuit of structural justice. To take a stark
case: Southern blacks of the 1950's did not deny that they were expected
to sit in segregated railways and buses. They sought to challenge existing
practice as unconstitutional, and the mere fact that they were defending a
common law trespass action did not seem to them sufficient reason to defer
their challenge.
This does not imply, of course, that the activist state will allow "pri-
vate" lawsuits to be transformed in activist ways whenever a party tries to
do so. All things considered, it may be wise, as Professor Mashaw sug-
gests,9 to insulate the system of "private law" from many of these activist
challenges and divert them to specialized institutions of structural justice.
But, then again, it may seem unwise, or even fundamentally unfair, for a
private party to gain legal victory by shunting the question of structural
injustice into some distant activist forum. The key point here is that the
question of coordinating the reactive (private) law with the system of ac-
tivist (public) law will be one of central significance to lawyers at all
levels. It could not, by definition, even arise in a purely reactive culture.
It is the centrality of this coordination question that constitutes the
sixth, and final, feature of my model of activist legal discourse. Its resolu-
9. See Mashaw, "Rights" in the Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1158-71 (1983).
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tion will characteristically be a complex business. Only one thing is clear:
Whenever a "private" litigant is allowed to raise questions of activist jus-
tice, the legal conversation in traditional law courts will be particularly
tension-filled-seeking somehow to mediate the five preceding features of
activist legal conversation with the very different conceptions of fact (one)
and value (two)-not to mention adjudication (three), democracy (four),
and finality (five)-generated by a purely reactive understanding of the
controversy.10
II. From Realism to Reconstruction
In remarking on the rise of the activist state, I hardly wish to claim
great novelty of insight. Much of the most important academic work since
the last World War is not only pregnant with a similar awareness but is
also marked by an effort to construct a new form of professional discourse
equal to the challenge of activist legal meaning. The most influential of
these Constructive efforts was the conception of legal process advanced by
Hart and Sacks,"1 and pursued vigorously by a host of area specialists
who looked to Cambridge for inspiration.12 For this group, it was plain
that the profession could no longer see itself as primarily concerned with
the (reactive) aim of preparing a case for trial and attacking or defending
the jury's verdict on appeal. Instead, lawyers trained by Hart and Sacks
were always trying to understand the way their clients' interests were me-
10. For further reflections upon the procedural tensions involved in the coordination of active and
reactive themes in a single lawsuit, see P. SCHUCK, supra note 8, at 147-81; Eisenberg & Yeazell, The
Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); sources
cited supra note 6. The substantive dilemmas generated by the effort to define legitimate reliance
interests while pursuing activist objectives has been at the center of my own work in property law, see
B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Ackerman, Regulating Slum
Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistri-
bution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971), as well as that of many others working on the foundations
of the common law in an activist polity, compare Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice,
89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980) (libertarian interpretation of contract untenable) with C. FRIED, CONTRACT
AS PROMISE (1981) (moral foundations of contract analytically distinct from pursuit of social goals);
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (torts as vehi-
cle for pursuit of complex social goals) with Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 537 (1972) (moral foundations of torts analytically distinct from pursuit of social goals). For
some more general reflections on the relationship between the protection of individual rights and the
pursuit of activist ideals, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221
(1973). I have also profited greatly from Meir Cohen's forthcoming book, Persons and Organizations.
11. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of
Law (tent. ed. 1958)-undoubtedly the most influential unpublished work in recent legal history.
12. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); H. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
(1968). I discuss this group further in Ackerman, Book Review, 103 DAEDALUS, Winter 1974, at 119
(reviewing J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)); see also White, The Evolution of Rea-
soned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973) (rela-
tionship of legal process school to legal realism).
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diated by the ongoing interaction between court, bureaucracy, and legisla-
ture. Within this framework, advocacy before a court was no longer ex-
hausted by an effort to elaborate the structure of institutionalized
expectations expressed in the common law. Instead, courts were to be in-
structed elaborately upon their own lawmaking limitations. Rather than
reacting to particular fact-situations as if they were the primary
lawmakers, the courts were first to identify those legal functions better
performed by bureaucracies and legislatures, the rising stars in the activist
legal universe. Indeed, it is this exercise of institutional coordination that
gave the judiciary a new professional mission. As a corps of generalists
with life tenure, judges were in a unique position to understand the com-
parative advantages of each of the diverse lawmaking institutions of the
activist state, and thereby help different institutions work together in a
partnership for the public good.
Yet, however important this step, the legal process construction was
plainly inadequate in two particulars. First, and most obviously, these
scholars operated with inadequate models of the bureaucratic and legisla-
tive processes they sought to assimilate into the legal consciousness.
Rather than building realistic, let alone rigorous, models of bureaucratic
and legislative behavior, they were content with simplistic conceptions of
these alien institutions. While legal process scholars were perfectly aware
that legislatures and bureaucracies made bad mistakes, these errors were
treated as a series of isolated blunders, not the product of systemic fail-
ures. For each individual blunder, the job of the court was to engage the
errant institution in Socratic dialogue, focusing the attention of legislators
and bureaucrats on dimensions of the problem they somehow missed the
first time around. The hopeful implication was that, under proper legal
questioning, bureaucrats would make good their promise of expertise, and
legislators would redeem their claims to democratic legitimacy. The possi-
bility of some deeper structural failing in the process of activist lawmaking
was, apparently, not something that lawyers had much to say about."3
An even more serious failing, and the central one for our purposes,
13. This deficiency is slowly being corrected by recent writers in the legal process tradition. See,
e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980); Chayes, supra note 6; Fiss, supra note 6. Unfortunately, these contemporary writ-
ers fail to move beyond the legal process tradition's casual treatment of legislative and bureaucratic
phenomena. Thus far, there has been very little inclination to draw on analytic political science in an
effort to elaborate the many different scenarios that may ultimately engender one or another break-
down in the legislative or bureaucratic process. For some pioneering efforts along these lines, see W.
NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, COR-
RUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978); Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Ap-
plication of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the F.C.C. and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717 (1979).
For a more general treatment of these issues, see D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); A. SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
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becomes clear when we turn from legal process to legal substance. Here,
the Harvard group simply had nothing to offer, other than a vague recog-
nition that new forms of expertise were aborning somewhere in bureau-
cracy-land. Moreover, when other brave scholars tried to fill this large
gap, they succeeded only in generating mass skepticism about the profes-
sion's capacity to organize the vast heaps of substantive law thrown up by
the New Deal and its successors. There is much to be said, both pro and
con, about the extraordinary reconceptualization of legal discourse ad-
vanced by Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal in collaboration with a
dedicated group of students whom they inspired in postwar New Haven.14
The important point here, however, was the profession's refusal to engage
in the argument. With the notable exception of international law, the
School utterly failed to establish itself as a conversational presence in
ongoing professional interchange. Rather than indulge in New Haven
Newspeak, the profession reacted skeptically to the very idea that the bur-
geoning law of the activist state permitted much in the way of cogent legal
generalization. The life of the law was to be found instead in the sensitive
formulation of highly particularistic rules and the resolute refusal to gen-
eralize the rules beyond the particular contexts that gave them meaning.
It is precisely this Realistic attitude"5 toward law that is currently
under attack by the Constructive generation now rising to professional
maturity. In contrast to the Realist's effort to grasp each particular dis-
pute in its infinite particularity, Constructive lawyers emphasize the dan-
ger of exaggerating the legal importance of the idiosyncratic. They call
instead for a "statement of the facts" that relates individual conflicts to the
more general structural tensions of social life. In contrast to the Realist's
refusal to generalize about legal values, Constructive lawyers fear that
muddled efforts to improve upon the invisible hand will yield a world
even less just and humane than free-market capitalism. They call instead
for the systematic test of particular activist interventions by legal princi-
ples that seek to capture the basic ideals that have led the American peo-
ple to embrace activism in the first place. The development of a structural
statement of the facts and an abstract analysis of activist values is permit-
ting, in turn, a much broader and richer legal conversation. For the first
time in a long time, American lawyers in widely different specialties are
beginning to talk to one another in a common language about legal sub-
stance, no less than legal process, and thereby to recognize broader inter-
14. A good summary of the Lasswell-McDougal approach may be found in M. MCDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 1-127 (1963). For a revealing early
pronouncement, see McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Train-
ing in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
15. The character of Realist discourse, and its relationship both to Constructivism and to the rise
of the activist state, are discussed more thoroughly in B. ACKERMAN, supra note f, at 6-22.
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relationships, deeper dilemmas.
No less significantly, this Constructive breakthrough has not been
achieved in the grand manner of Lasswell and McDougal, with some
masterful Synthesizer providing the rest of lawyerdom with a synoptic vi-
sion. Instead, the new language of power is being pieced together out of a
very diverse set of insights contributed by a rather disorganized group of
scholars and practitioners who borrow ideas from one another when the
needs of their particular projects seem to require it. While this pragmatic
process of give-and-take is the best evidence of the dynamism of the Con-
structive enterprise, it does engender dangers of its own-most notably
that lawyers may lose sight of the deeper presuppositions that implicitly
organize the sound and fury of the work of Construction proceeding all
around them.
This danger is all the greater for the ease with which a key element of
the new Constructivism admits of misinterpretation. I refer to the complex
rhetoric called "law and economics." Instead of coming to terms with this
rising movement, some have sought to dismiss it as an ideological smoke
screen for a reactionary legal assault upon the humane aspects of the
American activist state, an assault that should be resisted by all progres-
sive lawyers. However beguiling this simple interpretation might be, espe-
cially when it is trumpeted as the last word in Critical legal theory, 6 I
hope to persuade you that it is both superficial and counterproductive.
Superficial, because it is based on a failure to investigate those deeper
16. For a particularly conventional statement of Critical wisdom, see Horwitz, Law and Econom-
ics: Science or Politics?, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); for a particularly elaborate one, see Ken-
nedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). On
one level, Kennedy's critique represents little more than a rehash of conventional welfare economics.
The essay's novelty lies not so much in its analysis but in its neo-Realist motivation. It seeks to
demonstrate, once again, that abstract and formal doctrinal analysis cannot yield legal certainty, that
only particularistic intuition can yield insight into our activist legal system. See also Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1751-78 (1976) (there is no
such thing as an "easy case"); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973) (liberal
theory does not offer legitimate distinction between rulemaking and rule application).
But, alas, no critic can reach ground that is higher than the position he chooses to assault. Ken-
nedy's critique does serious damage only to Chicago extremists who believe that "efficiency" is an
entirely unambiguous and obviously desirable legal value that permits a pseudo-mechanical identifica-
tion of "the" correct legal answer in every case. See Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Determination of "Legal Entitlements," 36 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming). Indeed,
even when considered as a critique of a Chicago cartoon, I do not think Kennedy's demonstration gets
to the heart of the matter. While Kennedy is right in thinking that efficiency-talk may often yield an
indeterminate solution to a legal problem, American lawyers have long since mastered the art of using
legal principles even when they cannot be reduced to mechanical rules. See R. DWORKIN, supra note
10, at 14-80 (1977) (distinction between rules and principles). The basic inadequacies of the Chicago
approach to law and economics are its deemphasis of the pervasive character of transaction costs, see
infra pp. 1099-1113, and its distorted account of the fundamental values of the American legal tradi-
tion, see infra pp. 1113-25. Rather than lampooning Chicago cartoons, the task is to build a richer
construction of the American legal tradition, incorporating those-and only those-contributions of
"law and economics" that contribute to this enterprise.
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cultural structures that Critical legal analysts claim to emphasize in their
own work of demystification. Counterproductive, because this superficial
diagnosis will encourage the profession to disdain those Constructive skills
that are essential for the promotion of the progressive values the Critics
profess to champion. Rather than a hostile assault, "law and economics"
permits a vast enrichment of the conversational resources available to law-
yers trying to make sense of the legal foundations of an activist state.
Not that I wish to deny the laissez-faire sympathies of some leading
Chicago practitioners of the new form of activist law-talk. This is hardly
the first time, however, that both True Believers and Critical Critics have
managed to mistake the ultimate contribution of the movement they so
fervently applaud and malign. While I suppose all of us will have to en-
dure an extended shouting match pairing outrageous and self-congratula-
tory Chicagoan against obscure and critical Ungero-Marxist, 17 I hope to
urge the main line of conversation in a more Constructive direction.
Looked upon as a distinctive form of legal rhetoric, "law and economics"
is forcing lawyers to argue about facts and values in activist ways. While,
as in all pioneering efforts, the emerging discourse is sometimes shock-
ingly primitive, the task is to make Constructive law-talk more sophisti-
cated, rather than to indulge in pseudo-Critical posturing.1 8
17. Or, if Ungero-Marxist seems too much of a mouthful, simply conjoin the last names of any
two of the other eminences who are so casually invoked as inspiration by a leading Critic: Foucault,
Gramsci, Hegel, Levi-Strauss, Mannheim, Marcuse, Piaget, Sartre. See Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 564 n.3 (1982); Kennedy, The Structure of Black-
stone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 210 n.2 (1979). Despite his aspiration to demystify
his legal brethren, Kennedy has yet to confront, let alone resolve, the obvious inconsistencies in the
views expressed by his favored authors. His fellow Critics, alas, only compound confusion by indulg-
ing in name-dropping of their own. See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059,
1060-61 n.1 (1980) (invoking, inter alia, Arendt, Durkheim, Kennedy, Mannheim, Marx, Unger,
Weber).
18. This view should not be confused with a more familiar idea. Here "law and economics" is
treated as if it were the name of yet another group of social scientists seeking to gain a detached
perspective upon the legal system from the vantage point of their social science specialty. While, Lord
knows, the legal system can stand all the illumination that it can get, it is not this promise that
accounts for the deep anxieties and high expectations that the movement has generated. Not even its
most determined opponents object to the existence of a few devoted folk in universities applying social
science methods to the legal system-after all, scientific investigation is what a university is all about,
and there is no good reason to exempt the legal system from scrutiny. The problem arises only be-
cause both supporters and opponents rightly suspect that there is more to "law and economics" than
disinterested science; that legal economics offers itself as a new language within which lawyers may
discharge their central task of pleading for relief on behalf of their clients. Since it is this claim that
accounts for the movement's controversial character, I shall not confuse matters by taking up the




III. Reconstructing the Facts
To bring the activist presuppositions of the new law-talk to light, reflect
upon the parable that now serves as the initiatory rite of passage for all
would-be lawyer-economists. I refer, of course, to the mock epic struggle
between rancher and farmer presented by Ronald Coase in The Problem
of Social Cost.19 In turning to such well-worn pages, I do not wish to
present yet another analysis of the precise conditions under which Coase's
theorem is a valid part of microeconomic science. Instead, I want to view
the Coase story as a model of a new form of power-talk lawyers may use
to persuade decisionmaking officials of the merits of their client's cause.2 0
When considered in this way, Coase is doing nothing less than inviting us
to transform the opening words of every legal conversation-words that
inevitably shape all that comes afterward. What is at stake is a radical
transformation of that peroration lawyers call, with charming disingenu-
ousness, "the statement of the facts."
A. The Coasean Paradigm
To grasp the activist character of the Coasean lawyer's proposal, begin
with his polar opposite. Imagine yourself a perfectly reactive lawyer faced
with a paradigmatic reactive legal problem. A farmer comes into your
office complaining about the neighboring rancher's unfortunate inclination
to allow his cows to eat the farmer's burgeoning crops. How would you go
about developing the relevant facts?
We remain sufficiently socialized into reactive habits of thought for the
answer to come easily. The place to begin is with the moment at which
"the trouble" broke out in an obvious way-here, the point at which the
rancher's cows started chomping away at the farmer's crop. In scrutiniz-
ing the incident for usable evidence, moreover, the reactive lawyer will
have a definite goal in view. Since he is, by definition, concerned with the
deviance of particular actions, he will focus upon facts that might support
the view that the rancher's actions were not all that the community might
fairly demand of him. In sifting these facts, the reactive lawyer will take
advantage of a rich set of distinctions that ordinary people use to make
sense of established expectations. Thus, he will have a relatively easy time
gaining substantial relief if he can persuade a jury that the rancher delib-
erately allowed his cows to cross over his property line to munch away. In
19. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
20. For an approach to the Coase theorem that begins from the same starting point, see Gjerd-
ingen, The Coase Theorem and the Psychology of Common Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 711
(1983). The evident differences between Gjerdingen's work and my own will not, I hope, obscure the
complementary character of concerns that we have developed over years of fruitful conversation.
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contrast, the rancher's lawyer will seek to convince the jury that the cattle
crossing occurred by mistake or through unavoidable accident. The result-
ing "statement of the facts" will typically report events that are densely
packed around the moment of obvious trouble, trailing back in time only
in directions made relevant by familiar notions of culpability, excuse, and
justification.21
1.
If this much is recognized, we are in a position to grasp the fundamen-
tal character of the Coasean transformation. The starting point for this
reformulation is the assumption that both rancher and farmer were in
perfect positions to predict 22 the future consequences of their actions at a
time at which they could have made cost-minimizing adjustments in their
courses of conduct, or, stated in more formal terms, that both actors faced
"zero transaction costs."
To grasp the transforming power of this assumption, consider a hypo-
thetical of the kind that provides a staple of reactive casebooks.23 Imagine
that the cows ate the crops because the supervising cowhand had been
utterly incapacitated by a lightning bolt in a freak thunderstorm. Suppose
further that immediately after the rancher drove his injured employee to
21. These notions may, in principle, be refined through the art of ordinary language philosophy.
See Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROc. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 1 (1956-1957).
22. Note that the predictions imagined here are not probabilistic but deterministic in character.
The parties are assumed to know the precise outcome that will in fact be generated by each of their
possible courses of action, and not merely the way their behavior will affect the probability distribu-
tion of possible outcomes. The deterministic character of prediction follows immediately from the idea
of zero-transaction costs: After all, the only reason we settle for probabilistic prediction is the (infinite)
cost involved in learning enough about the world to be absolutely certain about the future!
Understandably, the idea of perfectly deterministic predictions seems to overwhelm the idealizing
capacities of the most resolute modelers amongst lawyer-economists. Even those Coaseans who tend to
minimize the reality of transaction costs recognize the costs involved in making deterministic predic-
tions, and typically assume that market actors use the standard probabilistic techniques-mean, vari-
ance, and so forth-in guessing about the future. This way of setting up the problem leads to a
characteristic emphasis by lawyer-economists upon the parties' attitudes toward risk and the imperfec-
tions of insurance markets. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 51-
56 (1983); Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1 (1982). For a
characteristic application of probabilistic analysis in tort law, see Shavell, On Liability and Insurance,
13 BELL J. ECON. 120 (1982). Even within this probabilistic framework, however, the parties are
presumed to know the risk they run when engaging in one or another activity. Hence, they cannot be
heard to complain of unfair surprise when the risk they have self-consciously assumed ex ante materi-
alizes ex post.
23. Although I shall be ringing changes on Coase's rancher-farmer theme, I suspect that analo-
gous points are most often made in classroom discussion of Vincent v. Lake Erie Trans. Co., 109
Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910), which seems to have found a place in most leading casebooks. See
M. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES
379 (1971); C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 36 (1977);
R. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 180 (1982); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V.
SCHWARTZ, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 134 (7th ed. 1982); H. SHULMAN, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY,
TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 47 (3d ed. 1976).
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the hospital, he personally rounded up the stray cattle and led them back
to his own property. For a reactive lawyer defending the rancher, such a
discovery would be a source of rhapsodic delight, since it would give him
the best possible chance to persuade the jury that the rancher should not
pay substantial damages for this regrettable yet unavoidable accident.
In contrast, the Coasean would interpret these facts in a very different
spirit. The nonexistence of transaction costs forces the Coasean to pre-
sume that, in designing his cow-herding activities, the rancher has taken
into account the probability that lightning bolts could strike. Thus, our
rancher was in a perfect position, before the lightning struck, to have
hired a second cowboy for the very purpose of controlling the cows during
the period of his fallen comrade's misfortune. If, after considering the
matter, the rancher decided that an extra cowboy was not worth the cost,
he should not be able to plead unavoidable accident when lightning strikes
to the farmer's disadvantage. Instead, the destruction of the farmer's crop
is the foreseeable consequence of the rancher's self-conscious decision to
forego the extra farmhand.
It is no exaggeration to say that there can be no such thing as an "acci-
dent" in the Coasean universe, or any other event that might extenuate
the rancher's responsibility for his cow's depredations. Regardless of its
superficial appearance, each action should be treated as if it were the
product of the rancher's self-conscious decision to pursue his interests at
the expense of his neighbors. It follows that the painstaking reactive effort
to assess the deviant character of particular actions-to distinguish the
accidental from the deliberate, the excusable from the unjustifiable-is
pointless within the limits of the Coasean idealization.
But we have only begun to measure the extent of the Coaseans'
destabilization of reactive discourse. Not only do they propose to treat all
actions as if they were the product of a consciously chosen plan, they also
insist on treating all non-actions in the same way. After all, given the
nonexistence of transaction costs, all actors may ponder their decisions to
remain inactive as deeply as they consider their affirmative activities.
Why, then, should they gain special immunity when harm is the foresee-
able consequence of their 'deliberate passivity?
Imagine, for example, that the farmer could show that there was no-
body on his property at the time the rancher's cows came achomping, and
hence that he was in no position to do anything to prevent the rancher's
depredations at the moment trouble broke out on the surface of social life.
Given this statement of the facts, it will seem obvious to reactive lawyers
that it is the rancher's cows that caused the harm, and that, prima facie, it
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is the rancher who ought to be held responsible for his cows' actions. 4 In
contrast, lawyer-economists will think that this kind of causal talk ob-
scures a clear understanding of the underlying structure of the situation.
According to them, no good lawyer should ever forget that the farmer, no
less than the rancher, is a potential planner of his activities. Indeed, as-
suming zero transaction costs, there were countless things the farmer
might have done before the event to avoid the possible harm. He could
have built an electric fence, say, to repel the cows abandoned by the light-
ning-struck cowboy. It is this failure to install the fence, no less than the
rancher's refusal to hire an extra cowboy, that the Coasean model identi-
fies as a critical fact worthy of legal attention. Simply because this critical
fact is less obvious from a superficial account of the cow-chomping inci-
dent, it should not be removed from the list of factors that helped to cause
the harm. Instead of sifting the facts in search of the cause of the trouble,
the lawyer-economist urges a conception of causation that recognizes how
a multiplicity of factors, operating over a lengthy period of time, contrib-
ute to our legal discontents.25
But it is one thing to describe the way in which the assumption of zero
transaction costs destabilizes the reactive lawyer's fact-finding enterprise,
quite another to grasp how this single assumption could accomplish such a
significant transformation. The answer may become clearer if we look
upon lawyers as if they were storytellers, and "statements of the facts" as
their effort to tell convincing stories. Now every good storyteller knows
that the point at which his narrative begins will crucially shape the nature
of his story line.26 Events occurring "before" the story starts will inevita-
bly be treated in a fragmentary way, as flashbacks justified only so far as
they enlighten the course of unfolding events. In contrast, a credible story-
teller must be more respectful of events occurring once the story has be-
gun. After the "beginning," the story must have a stronger narrative
structure, linking events together in a compelling way until the story
reaches its "end."
And it is precisely here, on this critical narrative matter of beginnings
24. Both the intuitive appeal and the ultimate limits of the reactive approach to causation can be
appreciated by a study of R. EPSTEIN, A THEORY OF STRICT LIABILITY: TOWARD A REFORMULATION
OF TORT LAW (1980); Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (1979); Ep-
stein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979);
Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (1979).
25. The most illuminating expression of this view by a lawyer-economist is to be found in Cala-
bresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
69 (1975).
26. I am referring here to yarns of the Zane Grey type. Although the modernist novel has made
us familiar with "stories" told in ways that fracture the traditional narrative's temporal and spatial
structure, I shall not here consider the reasons why the law typically demands more traditional story-
telling from its practitioners.
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and endings, that the assumption of zero transaction cost does its work.
Rather than beginning with the moment at which the actors get into some
form of obvious trouble, Coasean assumptions force the lawyer to start his
story at a much earlier point in time: when the parties might have reorga-
nized their activities in a way that would have avoided the trouble en-
tirely. From this ex ante perspective, the harmful actions arising at a later
time may only be symptoms of an earlier failure by rancher and farmer to
organize their activities in the best possible way. In contrast, the reactive
drama begins with the Coasean finale, the moment at which the cows
start munching. While, on occasion, the reactive storyteller may feel
obliged to flash back to some earlier moment to enlighten the parties' pre-
sent struggle, the nfarrative focuses upon the trouble itself. Within this
narrative framework, the rancher's failure to hire a second cowboy, or the
farmer's failure to electrify his fence, are but two of the countless non-
events whose lengthy elaboration threatens to destroy the narrative integ-
rity of the tale of deviance and destruction that so urgently needs telling.
To summarize this first, and most critical, difference, I will borrow
some useful terminology from Mark Kelman27 and say that the reactive
lawyer employs a narrow temporal frame in stating his facts, focusing
upon the culpability of the individual actions that constitute the obvious
disturbance of the peace. In contrast, the Coasean insists upon a broad
temporal frame, beginning at the moment farsighted men and women
might possibly have reorganized their activities to avoid the trouble.
Within this interpretive framework, the obvious problem serves as a
symptom of a potentially larger problem of social disorganization.
27. Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591,
593-94 (1981). As should be apparent, I also share Kelman's larger goal of explicating the interpre-
tive frameworks prevailing in the contemporary American legal culture. Putting all questions of detail
to one side, Kelman and I differ principally in the use to which we hope to put our project in legal
consciousness-raising. The only question Kelman seriously entertains is whether his interpretive pro-
ject is in the service of a neo-Marxist search for the subtle ways in which American law stabilizes
class domination or a neo-Realist effort to demonstrate the pervasive importance of "inexplicably
unpatterned mediators of experience, the inevitable nonrational filters we need to be able to perceive
or talk at all." Id. at 671. For me, however, there is a third lesson American lawyers may draw from
a deeper understanding of the principles implicit in their interpretive practice. Once the question of
temporal framing is brought to legal self-consciousness, perhaps lawyers will be able to reflect more
deeply upon the ways in which they are constructing legal reality and gradually proceed to make
better sense of the politico-legal world in which they find themselves. Rather than accepting Kelman's
interpretation of temporal framing as evidence of our collective "non-rationality," we should recall
Immanuel Kant's suggestion that the human capacity to interpret events in temporal terms provides a
key to the proper understanding of human rationality. See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 139-
40, 144-47 (N. Kemp-Smith ed. 1963).
In raising this more constructive possibility, I do not deny the pervasive reality of non-rational and
repressive elements in any existing legal regime. But that is not all there is to our (or any?) legal
system. Instead, the legal culture maintains a certain relative autonomy from other power sys-
tems-giving American lawyers the freedom to use their limited autonomy in thoughtful, as well as
mindless, ways. Is it not a task of scholarship to support the constructive use of law's limited
autonomy?
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Now this is just the transformation that is demanded by our model of
activist legal discourse. As we have seen, the activist lawyer cannot simply
assume the legitimacy of the ongoing structure of activities, but must
somehow be in a position to assess the extent to which entire practices
(here farming and ranching) require self-conscious restructuring through
the legal order. The Coasean's insistence that the legal story begins not
with the trouble, but with the way the parties might have reorganized
their activites to avoid it, is precisely the point at which the activist lawyer
would want to begin.
2.
It is true, of course, that the next stage in the activist legal
story-Coase's famous theorem-has been taken by many to teach a very
different lesson: warning us about the danger of overestimating the power
of law to reorganize activities. As cautionary tales go, however, the Coase
Theorem is pretty weak stuff. The crux, once again, is the critical role
that the absence of transaction costs plays in Coase's cautionary conclu-
sion. It is hardly dispiriting for an activist to learn that the law would not
affect the way in which perfectly foresighted ranchers and farmers organ-
ized their activities in a world of frictionless transactions. Everybody is
perfectly aware that the real world is no Coaseland, and that the Coase
parable can therefore serve only as a prologue that demands completion
by a systematic study of the countless transactional difficulties confronting
flesh-and-blood Americans as they try to organize their social lives. Thus,
the cautionary character of the theorem should not be allowed to obscure
the activist implications of the Coasean insistence that all legal stories be-
gin at a new narrative starting point. Indeed, the full Coasean statement
of the facts is certain to reveal a rationality gap-a set of real world struc-
tures that makes it impossible for actors to realize the hyper-rational po-
tential revealed by the Coasean prologue.
3.
Only at this point do the narrative accounts produced by different law-
yer-economists begin to diverge. While all are aware of the rationality
gap, they disagree about the extent to which a "statement of the facts"
loses legal credibility by failing to fill the gap with great gobs of thick
description. Simplifiers treat the Coasean narrative as more-than-half-the-
story. While they recognize the theoretical possibility of market failure,
they always seem surprised when they encounter one in the real world,
and try their best to convince themselves that the rationality gap may be
filled by some very interstitial form of judicial intervention. Complexifiers,
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in contrast, treat the Coase theorem as a prologue to a three-part drama:
act one, the elaboration of an intricate web of market imperfections; act
two, the emphatic denial of the possibility of a perfect solution; act three,
the complex description of the ways in which actors, constrained by heavy
transaction costs and bounded rationality, are likely to respond to an array
of second-best legal interventions.
Now, so far as each particular lawyer is concerned, the choice between
simplifying and complexifying strategies will be resolved by a complex of
personal, political, and even aesthetic motivations. Rather than indulging
in curbstone psychoanalysis, however, I am more interested in the longer-
term movement of professional culture. Here, there is reason to anticipate
a generational drift* toward increasingly complex narrative. To speak of
legal trailblazers: While the new legal rhetoric's recent past has been too
often characterized by sub-Posnerian simplification, the future drift will
be toward super-Calabresian complexity.2" For it is the very success of the
simplifiers in gaining attention for the new language of power that will
prove their ultimate undoing. The key point here is to recognize that, in
the law at least, familiarity breeds the very reverse of contempt. As soon
as lawyers are convinced that arguing about transaction costs may win
cases, they can be relied upon to complexify the new conceptual apparatus
in any way that will suit their clients' interest. Over time, it will become
increasingly clear that the varieties of transactional failure are almost infi-
nite and that the profession must develop an elaborate set of categories if
it hopes to complete the Coasean prologue in a way that is equal to the
wide range of transactional structures revealed by the stream of cases. The
predictable result is that the initial parable of the rancher and the farmer
will begin to seem a rather easy case of externality, in which only "imper-
fect information" and the costs of negotiating a full set of "contingency
contracts" impede the parties' capacity to reorganize their activities. Other
cases will reveal a deeper set of structural impediments. When held up to
the light of the Coasean model, our real world will come to seem a place
full of pervasive transactional problems with many names-"free ride,"
"moral hazard," "bounded rationality," "non-convex demand and supply
curves," "imperfections in capital markets," and so forth-each requiring
28. The approaches of these authors are set out in R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d
ed. 1977); G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, supra note 7; G. CALABRESI, supra note 10. It should be
noted that Coase's seminal article was delicately poised between simplicity and complexity: While the
essay begins with its path-breaking speculations about economic and legal life in a world without
transaction cost, see Coase, supra note 19, at 2-8, it concludes with a strong affirmation of the impor-
tance of taking transactional imperfections seriously in serious law and economics, id. at 15-19. At
about the same time Coase was writing his essay, Calabresi was reaching similar conclusions in work
proceeding independently of Coasean influence. See Calabresi, Decision for Accidents: An Approach
to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
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systematic attention in the analysis of one or another market failure.29
This new form of factual analysis, moreover, provides a powerful impe-
tus for distinctive forms of legal generalization. As the complexifying
Coasean states his version of "the facts" in more and more cases, it will
become ever clearer that different branches of the law treat similar market
failures very differently. "Nuisance," "products liability," "fault," for ex-
ample, will begin to seem different common law labels for handling a set
of interrelated problems organized by the existence of similar externalities
and related market failures. Since lawyers are taught that like cases
should be treated alike, this perception of factual similarity will generate a
cognitive drive for a new synthesis. Is it not time to think the externality
question through in a systematic way, reconstructing the law to deal re-
sponsively with the facts that the new analysis reveals to view?3o
This question applies with even greater force to the disordered heap of
statutory law that dominates today's legal landscape. Vast forests of statu-
tory detail, previously consigned to the wilderness of "environmental law"
or "health and safety legislation" or "oil and gas law" or "securities regu-
lation" can be reduced to cognitively manageable terms as soon as they are
seen as efforts to come to grips with a series of interrelated market fail-
ures. This perception, moreover, makes it possible for legal specialists to
increase vastly their range of reference as they debate the proper way of
responding to problems arising under their particular statutory regime.
While a layman might think that there is almost nothing in common be-
tween, say, the problems raised by securities fraud and those raised by air
pollution, a common externality analysis makes it possible for lawyers in
one field to learn from the regulatory experience in another.31 The ground
is being prepared for a professionally disciplined effort to compare and
assess a broad range of responses to market failure in terms of a common
legal language. 2
29. While lawyers can take advantage of an already enormous, and rapidly expanding, technical
literature in economics on all these subjects, the work that will have the largest impact will combine
technical mastery over the anatomy of transactional failure with a genuine appreciation of legal and
institutional complexity. For a seminal contribution of this kind, see 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES (1975).
30. For a particularly influential constructive answer to this question, see Calabresi & Melamed,
One View of the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972).
31. Not that the problems are identical, of course, but that makes the comparative market failure/
legal response analysis only more interesting.
32. In this regard, S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982), marks a breakthrough-not
so much in the novelty of its conceptual apparatus, but in its systematic and balanced application of
the new learning to a host of legal problems characteristic of an activist state. Rather than a path-
breaking article, Coase, supra note 19, or a brilliant monograph, G. CALABRESI, supra note 10, or a
student textbook, R. POSNER, supra note 28, Judge Breyer's book speaks in a persuasive way to
practicing lawyers grappling with the practical problems of activist legislation, administration, and (to
a lesser extent) adjudication. Even more important in this respect is the eight-volume treatite by P.
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B. Extending the Paradigm
The Coasean reconstruction of "torts" is not only important in itself; it
is also paradigmatic 3 of larger efforts by lawyers to reconstruct their in-
terpretation of "the facts" throughout the length and breadth of the legal
culture. While this essay cannot hope to establish such a sweeping claim,
two brief extensions may serve to render the hypothesis plausible.34
1.
The first extension follows the Coasean reformulation from its origin in
torts to neighboring. legal domains. To see the potential here, simply use
classical legal language to describe the way in which the Coasean manages
the movement from a narrow to a broad temporal framing of the standard
torts dispute. By beginning each torts dispute from an earlier point in
time, Coase invites us, as it were, to look upon all torts disputes as if they
began as problems of contract, in which farsighted farmers and ranchers
might bargain their way to a well-defined solution. If this emphasis on
contract, however, permits a new perspective on torts, might it not also
permit a new perspective on contract?
The answer is yes, and yet there are paradoxes aplenty in the rebirth of
contract heralded by Constructive lawyers. For the new emphasis on
transaction costs requires the lawyer to reflect upon the inadequacies of
contract as an organizational device in ways unknown to his more reactive
predecessors. No longer is the treatment of contract limited to the classic
excuses and justifications of interest to the reactive lawyer-mistake, im-
possibility, and so forth.35 There is a new emphasis upon the way each
individual bargain is constrained by different transactional impediments
that make frictionless negotiation impossible. Not only do the very same
transactional difficulties afflicting tort law-information-imperfections,
externalities, and so forth-also pervade contractual settings, but there are
also difficulties that are even more salient in contract than they were in
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLI-
CATION (vols. 1-3 (1978); vols. 4, 5 (1980); vols. 6, 7 (forthcoming); vol. 8 (1982))-the first time that
practitioners of the new learning have ever aspired to the legal authority that is uniquely associated
with the treatise form. For some further reflections on the changing role antitrust has played and is
playing in the development of the new form of legal analysis, see infra pp. 1108-09.
33. This is not a place to enter into the definitional wars surrounding Thomas Kuhn's use of the
idea of a paradigm in his seminal work, T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970). It would be disingenuous, however, to deny that Kuhn's work has been a source of inspira-
tion for the present essay.
34. A recent Symposium, published after work on this essay was completed, contains a good deal
of material that is relevant to an assessment of my hypothesis. See Symposium, The Place of Econom-
ics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1983).
35. These classical issues, however, will predictably be subjected to re-analysis. See A. KRONMAN
& R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979).
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torts-"moral hazard," "monitoring costs," "first mover advantages," and
the like."6
This recognition serves, in turn, as a second source of energy for the
activist generalizing impulse. Precisely because contract is a systematically
defective tool for coordination, it is natural to search for other legal forms
that might transcend the frictions of the contractual setting. However,
each of these forms-from the old law of principal and agent, through the
modern forms of partnership and corporation, to the varieties of govern-
mental ownership and regulation-is found, soon enough, to solve the
transactional problems of contract only to generate new kinds of transac-
tional difficulties of its own.
37
In addition, the systematic emphasis upon the inadequacies of contract
reinforces the sense that the particular troubles brought to the attention of
courts, agencies, and legislatures may well only be the symptoms of some
deeper organizational failure. As in torts, so in contracts, the Constructive
analysis forces the legal conversation to begin at a new point-starting the
story with the possibility that the law might reconstruct organizational
forms in ways that allow citizens to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the con-
flicts that appear so intractable on the surface of everyday life.
2.
It is odd, perhaps, to think of the second extension of Coasean analysis
as an extension at all. Chronologically at least, the lawyer-economist's
description of reality first achieved professional recognition not in the
fields of torts and contracts, but in public law areas like antitrust and
regulated industries.38 Indeed, the existence of these conversational beach-
heads helps explain, I think, the Coaseans' more recent successes in pene-
trating the legal culture. However disturbing a lawyer may find talk of
externality or contract failure, he cannot deny that the relevance of simi-
36. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981);
Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979); Williamson, The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
37. In addition to 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 29, and Williamson, supra note 36, the seminal
contribution of Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976), has prompted a renewed appreciation of the roots
of corporate structure in contractual failure-a lesson that Coase taught long ago in Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386 (1937).
38. See, e.g., C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALY-
SIS (1959); L. SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1952). Indeed, Coase
himself can be understood to have achieved his breakthrough in tort law by generalizing the transac-
tional approach to questions of industrial organization he had developed earlier. See Coase, supra note
37; Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959). Given the historical
depth of the lawyer-economist's treatment of industrial organization, it is hardly surprising that the
new learning has first expressed itself in the form of an authoritative treatise in this area. See P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 32.
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lar-sounding stuff is an established professional fact across the dim bound-
ary that separates private from public law in an activist state. 9 Yet, de-
spite its priority in time and its continuing legal importance, I do not
think it wrong to subordinate the old law and economics to the new in this
sketch of the present legal situation. For, so long as the use of "law and
economics" was restricted to a small number of specialities, the distinctive
character of the antitrust lawyer's construction of reality could be plausi-
bly viewed as a cultural phenomenon of purely local legal signifi-
cance-on a par, say, with the use of psychoanalytic discourse by the
criminal lawyer when dealing with the insanity defense. It is only with
the new law and economics that the cultural whole comes to seem larger
than the sum of its parts: when the old law and economics is coupled with
the new, the result is not two distinct legal discourses but a general legal
discourse permitting lawyers, regardless of their field, to draw upon a
common fund of Constructive ideas.
Indeed, this fact is signaled by the way in which the old law and eco-
nomics takes on more general legal meaning for lawyers who were sub-
limely indifferent to it in the past. No longer denoting isolated specialties,
"antitrust" and "regulation" mark conversational areas in which the
structural descriptions increasingly familiar in torts and contracts are gen-
eralized yet further: from this-or-that struggle between rancher and
farmer, this-or-that response to contractual failure, to the way entire sec-
tors of the economy relate to one another. As in the more microscopic
forms of structural analysis, legal conversation begins here with an imagi-
nary prologue about life in a frictionless world inhabited by hyperrational
actors capable of recognizing all the implications of their organizational
activities. Once again, however, the analysis of the frictionless world of
perfect competition can serve only as a prologue for real-world analysis, in
which one gains an understanding of the way firms exploit underlying
production possibilities and transactional barriers to gain competitive ad-
vantages over potential rivals. As always, some lawyer-economists-the
Chicagoans-tend to become impatient at this point in the story. Just as
they would like lawyers to talk torts as if they lived in a world very close
to Coase's never-never land, so too they are happiest when talking about
antitrust in a world that seriously departs from "perfect" competition only
rarely and in well understood ways. But there is nothing that forces the
rest of us to mistake the prologue for the play.4"
39. See supra pp. 1092-94.
40. Economic efficiency, of course, is not necessarily all there is to antitrust. Even those-and I
am one of them-who resist the Chicago reduction of antitrust policy to "economic efficiency," in the
manner of R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WrT ITSELF (1978), would
hardly deny that the economist's "statement of the facts" is an essential preliminary to the mature
legal discussion of the political and economic values at stake in the law of industrial organization.
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C. Enriching the Paradigm
We find ourselves, then, in the midst of a very rare event in the life of
the law-the rise to professional maturity of a new construction of the
facts. How, then, to make the most of our maturity?
1.
Beginning on the technical level, it is not too early to call for the next
advance in activist fact-finding sophistication. It is one thing, say, to recog-
nize that the Clean Air Act can be viewed as a response to a complex set
of externalities or that ERISA, the federal statute regulating private pen-
sions, may be viewed as a response to the problems of contractual failure.
It is quite another thing to make the concrete factual findings necessary to
frame a professional discussion of the extent to which the Clean Air Act
or ERISA can, through proper bureaucratic and judicial interpretation as
well as legislative revision, be made into appropriate legal responses to the
structural problems that have been identified. To take this step, we cannot
content ourselves with a graphic description of Smokestack No. 9's belch-
ing black discharges or a story about the way the loyal Mary Jones was
deprived of her pension by the sudden failure of Bankrupt, Inc. While
such anecdotes may catalyze concern, we must set them in a larger con-
text, systematically describing the way a mass of industrial emissions
moves from airshed to airshed to cause pollution or the way people move
from job to job on their path to an impoverished retirement.
To appraise these facts competently, we must rehabilitate a word that,
in current professional usage, functions as little more than an all-purpose
term of abuse: "formalism." Whatever may have been true during an ear-
lier time, "formalism" can no longer be taken to imply an attitude of
blind indifference to the facts of social life. Instead, it is continuing hostil-
ity to "formalism" that will condemn lawyers to fact-finding impotence in
the modern era. Quite simply, we are already in the midst of a revolution
in information-processing that permits, for the first time in history, a dis-
ciplined empirical analysis of the structural facts of central importance to
activist legal decision. Increasingly, the call for an appropriate "statement
of the facts" will generate mountains of computer printout detailing a pro-
liferating number of scenarios of obvious relevance to responsible activist
decisionmaking. And until lawyers understand the formal economic, polit-
ical, and sociological presuppositions of particular computer analyses, they
can play only three roles in the fact-finding process. Most obviously, they
may play the obscurantist, and deny that the computer printout is worth
the paper it is written on; or they may worship blindly before the shiny
new shrine of the American Enlightenment, and believe everything the
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computer tells them (so long as it is not patently absurd); or they may
play the moralizer and make sure that the manipulators of the black box
are not obviously corrupt or biased. And of course, they may combine all
three poses in the endless permutations known to every student of modern
administrative law.
One thing they will not be able to do, however, is to engage in a mean-
ingful dialogue with the model builders. Yet it is only through this dia-
logue that lawyers can help unearth many of the controversial legal ques-
tions that are raised in every effort to state the structural facts. While a
conversation between lawyers and modelers can misfire even under the
best of institutional conditions, administrative law cannot even begin to
take institutional problems seriously as long as lawyers are professionally
incapable of carrying on their side of the dialogue. Until the profession
achieves minimal discursive competence, the legal pursuit of activist values
will increasingly proceed on the basis of a "statement of the facts" that
begs all sorts of fundamental legal questions.41
Not that every competent lawyer must be put into a position to manip-
ulate the latest computer-software package on his own. The key here, as
elsewhere, is to permit the lawyer to ask the right questions-questions
that arise time after time in appraising the computer construction of legal
reality. My own experience teaching such matters"2 suggests, moreover,
that a good deal could be achieved along these lines in a relatively short
period of time-certainly no more time than the average law student char-
acteristically devotes to the mysteries of trial practice and the law of evi-
dence.43 What is lacking at present, however, is a general recognition of
the pressing legal importance of questioning computers with the same se-
riousness that we already invest in cross-examining eyewitnesses to the
disturbing events that catalyze the concern of reactive lawyers. It is, in
short, past time to redeem Holmes' century-old prediction that the future
of the law belongs to the master of statistics, no less than economics."
Indeed, to allow law students to continue to graduate without the slightest
understanding of statistical reasoning and formal modeling is nothing
short of a scandalous dereliction of our professional responsibilities. 45 If
41. The legal challenges posed by a rising technocracy are discussed more elaborately in B. ACK-
ERMAN, supra note t, at 105-10.
42. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1982); B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-
ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
(1974).
43. Moreover, entering students can be expected to come to law school with an increasingly so-
phisticated store of computer lore, thereby making the pedagogic task more manageable over time.
44. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
45. Indeed, insofar as the computer is entering legal education, it is as an instructional gimmick,
allowing the student a new form of interactive instruction that may usefully complement more tradi-
tional forms of pedagogy. While I have no doubt that "programmed learning" ought to occupy an
1111
The Yale Law Journal
we continue down this misguided path, we will in the end break a funda-
mental promise made by the New Deal: that American lawyers can in-
deed help keep the law responsive to the changing facts of social life in a
way that promotes the activist concerns of their fellow Americans.
There is, of course, a danger here-that the Constructive lawyer of the
future may become a computer addict who is obtuse to any fact he cannot
model and quantify. The best cure for such a disease, however, is some
thoughtful professional training in the uses and abuses of computer-mod-
eling in the activist legal process. For the next generation, moreover, the
more serious legal pathologies will arise from acute computer anemia,
rather than computer addiction. In particular, a profession of statistical
innocents will tend unduly to fixate upon the just-so stories the simplify-
ing Chicagoan will be happy to tell about life in Coaseland, rather than to
push onward to the concrete investigation of the transactional failures that
arise in the real world. If we are to move beyond Chicago-style simplici-
ties, the cure must be more computer modeling, rather than less; a deeper
appreciation of the complexities of market failure and probabilistic infer-
ence, rather than an uncritical attack on formalism in all its forms."'
2.
And the same is true when it comes to the next generation's effort to
move beyond the more fundamental limitations of the Coasean construc-
tion of reality. A Constructivist theory that focuses upon the varieties of
market failure without paying equal attention to the reality of political
and bureaucratic failure is transparently inadequate. Yet we continue to
tolerate a professional discussion of these matters that rarely moves be-
yond the banalities of high school civics. This failure is all the more curi-
ous in light of the achievements of the last generation of political scien-
tists. While some of this work requires formal logic for its ready
comprehension, almost all of it is easier to understand than modem math-
ematical economics. 47 There is no excuse for activist lawyers to ignore its
obvious relevance to their central concerns: How can we possibly under-
important place in legal education, this is not the kind of instruction I am advocating here. Rather
than programming computers to teach law to lawyers, I am interested in educating lawyers to keep
computers under legal control.
46. While critical theorists have been emphatic in their condemnation of "formalism," see, e.g.,
Kennedy, Legal Formality, supra note 16, at 377-91; Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, supra note 16, they have not yet, so far as I know, specifically focused upon the use of
the computer in activist fact-finding. Is it too late to hope that a more discriminating critical attitude
toward formalism may yet emerge?
47. Seminal writings in this area include K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(1951); D. BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); A. HIRSHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970); M. OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
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stand the activist state without a clear sense of the ways legislatures and
bureaucracies can use and abuse their powers?
It is no less obvious that the present-day Coasean has not even begun to
consider how the law shapes social perception and evaluation through a
complex process of education and indoctrination."8 Although this is a very
great failing, it simply serves to mark Coaseanism, despite its triumph in
redefining the legal time-frame and refocusing attention upon the reorgan-
ization of activities, as a very primitive form of Constructive thought. It is
a strength, rather than a weakness, of the present moment that this failure
is so transparent. Collective dissatisfaction serves as the best prod for
deeper Construction in the years ahead.
IV. Constructing Legal Values
The Constructive effort to "state the facts" does more than just impose
new cognitive demands upon lawyers who wish to perform credibly in the
computer age. It also places great pressure on the legal culture to confront
the underlying values at stake in the ongoing effort at activist governance:
How to tell a market "failure" from a market "success"? What are the
legal values endangered by the uncontrolled operation of the invisible
hand?
These questions can no longer be consigned by the profession to some
faraway conversational domain inhabited by politicians and citizens. With
increasing frequency, lawyers will find themselves confronting a cluttered
desk heaped high with bureaucratic edicts, judicial utterances, and legisla-
tive commands. If they are to shape all this raw law-stuff into persuasive
argument, they can hardly avoid reflecting upon the more general activist
values that putatively justify all this legal activity. Rather than accepting
the reactive constraint upon professional argument,49 perplexed activist
lawyers will look to Constructive essays-of the kind presented by Rich-
ard Stewart in this Symposium 50-for normative orientation.
Though the prevailing rationales for governmental intervention will be-
come a principal subject for lawyerly conversation, the need for some kind
of professional discipline will, however, remain undiminished. After all, so
long as we live in a democratic state, it is up to the People, and not their
48. For a usefully skeptical review of the sociological literature, see Hyde, The Concept of Legiti.
mation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379; for an illuminating effort to reinvigorate
Weberian insights, see A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER (1983); for my own choices in contemporary cul-
tural anthropology and sociology, see Ackerman, supra note 2, at 372 & nn.41-44.
49. See supra pp. 1086-88.
50. See Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE
L.J. (1983) (forthcoming). This is not the place to discuss the particular points at which I agree or
disagree with Stewart's substantive account of activist legal values. My point here involves the genre
of activist legal writing which Stewart's essay exemplifies.
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lawyers, to decide upon the activist principles that will inform the legal
system. 51 If lawyers do not like the principles, P, that the People have
chosen, they can try to persuade the People to change their mind. In the
meantime, they have a democratic obligation to use P, rather than not-P,
in legal argument. How, then, to identify those activist principles that
have already been endorsed by the People and distinguish them from the
not-Ps that are still struggling for recognition in the agon of democratic
politics? It would be nice, I suppose, if the People's representatives stated
their activist principles clearly and incisively on the surface of their legis-
lation. In the half-century since the New Deal, however, American law-
yers have begun to reconcile themselves to the reality of a very different
legal world, one full of dim light and half shadow.
Not that our legal picture is entirely gray on gray. Certain things are so
plain as to be beyond serious argument. Fifty years after the New Deal, it
is no longer plausible to assert that American law is governed by strict
adherence to laissez-faire principles; it is equally silly to suppose that the
New Deal has ushered in an era of Marxist collectivism. While right- and
left-wing excursions into doctrinal analysis may well contain valuable in-
sights, they inevitably oversimplify our present legal situation, in which a
distinctive complexity is generated by the New Deal's effort to depart
from Lockean laissez faire without taking the path to Marxist collectiv-
ism. The challenge, in short, is to make sense of the distinctive topography
of a legal system that aims to occupy the high middle ground disdained by
the followers of Locke and Marx alike. How, then, to elaborate and iden-
tify the aims of a legal system that is activist without being authoritarian,
liberal without being libertarian?
A. The Poverty of Welfare Economics
It is here, once again, that the lawyer-economist is all too eager to offer
assistance to the puzzled Constructivist. If economics permits a disciplined
way of talking about the facts of market life, will it not also answer the
normative questions raised by the new structural facts?
The slightest degree of historical perspective should caution against an
overly eager yes. Economics, after all, has suffered its own ordeals during
the last half-century. Most important for our purposes is its extraordinary
success in purging itself of explicit and elaborate reflection on its relation
to the broader problems of political philosophy.52 Perhaps this absolute
51. See supra p. 1092.
52. A philosophically sophisticated history of the past half-century's intellectual developments in
Anglo-American economics has yet to be written. For a clever review of the literature, see McCloskey,
The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. ECON. LIT. 481 (1983). For the canonical decree establishing an
absolute divorce between economics and philosophy, see L. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE &
SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE ch. 6 (1932). Robbins' arguments betray a naive self-confidence
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divorce from philosophy was the price economists had to pay for their
century-long marriage to English utilitarianism. The only way to free the
profession from its former love was to assure it that the entire question
that utilitarianism sought to answer was utterly "meaningless." Perhaps,
as many economists themselves believe, good positive economics requires
the profession to draw a hard positivist line against the infection of factual
findings by subjective value judgments. In any event, a pervasive suspicion
of elaborate value-talk is now a deeply rooted professional prejudice
among economists-one that will take a long time to undo, if undoing
there is to be.53 In the meantime, however, the profession's strong positiv-
ist prejudices must be taken into account by any lawyer who wants to
master economics for law's purposes, rather than the other way around.
Before following the Chicagoan on a quick raid across the disciplinary
frontier in quest of "economic efficiency," Constructive lawyers must rec-
ognize that the discipline of welfare economics was not formulated with
their interpretive needs in mind. To put it mildly, Hicks, Kaldor, Scitov-
sky54 and the rest were not primarily trying to develop a form of value-
talk capable of expressing the distinctive concerns of the modern American
activist state. Instead, the founders of contemporary welfare economics
were seeking to find a place for value discourse within a profession caught
up in an extreme form of positivism that called into question the meaning-
fulness of any normative judgments. In such a hostile environment, those
seeking to rehabilitate the meaningfulness of normative discourse should
be expected to proceed with extreme caution. Only a foolish advocate
would try to persuade such an audience of the error of its ways by pro-
ducing an all-inclusive theory relating principles of market exchange to a
comprehensive conception of social justice. Given its positivist prejudices,
the audience would simply be unwilling to suspend its disbelief for the
time necessary to consider an argument as long and complex as, say, the
one to be found in A Theory of Justice."5
If the advocate was to make any headway at all against the attitude that
in the logical positivism then so important in English philosophy. The frequency with which Robbins
is still parroted a half-century later provides the best index of the extent to which professional econo-
mists have insulated themselves from the main currents of contemporary philosophy.
53. At the moment, the most important philosophical voice within economics is surely Amartya
Sen's. See, e.g., Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL 463 (1979); Sen, Rational Fools: A
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977). Un-
fortunately, Sen's philosophical interests, like those of Kenneth Arrow in the preceding generation,
may turn out to be so exceptional that they merely confirm the profession's pronounced positivist
prejudices.
54. For representative works, see Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J.
696 (1939); Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49
ECON. J. 549 (1939); Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. EON. STUD.
77 (1941).
55. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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all normative judgments were "arbitrary," he would have to adopt a very
different rhetorical strategy-one familiar to any lawyer who has tried to
convince a jury deeply suspicious of his client's cause. Rather than pro-
duce an elaborate alibi whose very complexity reinforces the jury's suspi-
cions, the rhetorical objective is to advance a "simple" story that seems so
"obvious" that the jury would be seduced into suspending, for a moment,
its pervasive suspicions. Given the welfare economist's particular audi-
ence, moreover, the selection of an "obvious" story is not very difficult. If
a jury of professional economists might be induced to believe anything, it
would accept the notion of Pareto-superiority: if a trade between A and B
makes nobody worse off, and at least one better off, then it is a good
thing. After all, what would you think if you were going to spend your
entire life describing trading behavior?
However humbling this may seem to the economist, it is only by liken-
ing him to a trial lawyer that I can account for a remarkable rhetorical
anomaly in the welfare economics literature. Although the writing in this
field is notorious for its formalism, subtlety, and complexity, Pareto-supe-
riority is typically presented as if it were some form of self-evident truth
whose mere utterance suffices to demonstrate its validity. Repeat after me:
What could one possibly say against a legal change that one person thinks
makes him better off when the change does not make anybody else say
that he is worse off?
The answer is that there is a lot that could be said: a great deal, for
example, about the way capitalist ideological hegemony prevents most of
us from understanding our true interests. From the tone of his voice, how-
ever, the welfare economist makes it indisputably plain that he means to
be asking a rhetorical question, one not to be taken seriously.5" Indeed,
silence is probably his best response: if he actually tried to explain why he
thought objections to Pareto-superiority misconceived, ninety-nine times
out of a hundred he would merely demonstrate that he was philosoph-
ically unequipped for the task.
Do not mistake me. I do believe that Pareto-superiority is, in general,
an appropriate tool for lawyerly appraisal within a liberal legal system
like ours-though even here there are problem cases that can profit from
special consideration.5 My point is not that Pareto-superiority is indefen-
sible in serious legal conversation (indeed, I have written a book defending
it),56 but that it is only within a peculiar professional culture that an ad-
56. In contrast to the normal usage in this essay, "rhetoric" is advanced here as a term of
opprobrium.
57. The dilemma of the Paretian liberal is described in Sen, Liberty and Soda] Choice, 90 J.
PHIL. 29 (1983); the case of Shifty is discussed in B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 197-98 (1980).
58. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 57, especially at 168-200.
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vocate might successfully persuade an otherwise skeptical jury that the
principle needs no defense.
Once we recognize this, we may gain some lawyerly insight into the
next stage in the rhetorical development of welfare economics. As with
any other effort to articulate a simple proposition that will serve as moral
bedrock, the problem with Pareto-superiority is that it has a very limited
domain of practical application. Most real world legal arguments generate
results that, even when viewed ex ante, make some people better off only
at the cost of making others worse off. As this becomes plain, moreover,
only two responses are possible.
The first is purism: as soon as the welfare economist glimpses norma-
tive complexity, he refuses to dirty his hands with the messy business of
normative judgment. Beyond Pareto-superiority, there is nothing but a
forest of subjective value-judgments that have nothing to do with econom-
ics. While this is a common attitude among mathematical economists,
there are bound to be more down-to-earth folks who insist on talking
about the hard cases that arise in real life. And yet, since systematic nor-
mative reflection is no longer a professional option, only one response re-
mains plausible: the path that lawyers call reasoning by analogy.
When confronted with one of the numberless hard cases in which V's
legal victory means L's loss, the applied economist need not despair. In-
stead, guided by his structural statement of the facts, he can glimpse a
fruitful analogy between his problem case and the easy cases of genuine
Pareto-superiority. After all, his "statement of the facts" presents each
problem case as if it were a botched bargain whose consummation has
been prevented only by a set of market failures. How natural, then, to
analogize the botched bargains that make so much normative trouble in
the real world to the perfected bargains that might have been reached in
the frictionless world of perfect markets? Once this analogy is made, the
promise of relief for normative puzzlement is not far away. Just as the
economist readily intuits the goodness of real Pareto bargains, can he not
also applaud the results of potential bargains? Is there really so much
difference between the two cases, after all? While L may in fact be devas-
tated by the losses he is asked to bear as a result of a potential Pareto
improvement, the fact is that V would have been willing to buy L off
were it not for the transactional obstacles blocking V's way. Should the
potential for a genuine Pareto improvement not be enough to warrant
praise of the legal change as "economically efficient?"
It is true, of course, that the devastated Ls of this world may not find
much consolation in the thought of the hypothetical riches that would
have been theirs in the economist's frictionless Utopia. Moreover, just as
the economist never tires of telling disappointed Ls that there is no such
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thing as a free lunch, L's lawyer is always free to respond by insisting
that there is no such thing as a perfectly persuasive analogy. Indeed, the
lawyer knows from long experience that a speaker can use an analogy in
a rhetorically persuasive fashion only if he succeeds in inducing his audi-
ence to forget the disanalogous features of the troublesome case. After all,
real world Ls have not in fact bargained for anything. Indeed, they
emerge from their hypothetical bargains worse off than they were before
they were forced into this odd kind of contract. Rather than allowing the
applied economist a cheap analogy with honest-to-goodness bargaining,
the lawyer insists upon a sober recognition of the differences, as well as
the similarities, between the hard cases of potential Pareto optimality and
the easy cases of genuine Pareto improvement: When is it fair to hold a
loser to hypothetical contracts? What is so significant about contract anal-
ogies anyway? Does the applied economist wish to ground his analogy
upon a deeper theory of contractarian legitimacy? If so, why? If not, what
are the principles of political legitimacy that provide the justification for,
and constraints upon, the use of hypothetical contracts as a legitimating
metaphor in dispute resolution?
It is at this point, alas, that the conversation outstrips the applied econ-
omist's positivistic professional repertoire. If forced to justify his analogy,
the applied economist finds himself in an awkwardly exposed position. On
the one hand, he knows the purists of the profession find his efforts to
extend intuitions of Pareto-superiority to hard cases theoretically indefen-
sible. On the other hand, he knows that an effort to justify his recurring
invocation of hypothetical contracts will force him into a field, political
philosophy, which he is unprepared to enter as a result of his positivistic
inheritance. How, then, to answer the challenge to the easy analogy that
lies at the foundation of his appeal to "economic efficiency?"
My own conversations with applied economists suggest that by far the
most common response at this point is some plea of confession and avoid-
ance. "What choice do I have?," the applied economist asks rather plain-
tively. Must I really relapse into purism or lunge blindly into the undis-
ciplined expression of subjective value judgments? It is only by speaking
in terms of potentially Pareto "economic efficiency" that I can preserve
any professional discipline at all in my talk about real world problems. Is
it not appropriate for me, then, to distinguish between those "distribu-
tional" judgments that are entirely beyond my professional ken and those
judgments of "economic efficiency" upon which I can pronounce with
something-like-professional-competence? True, I cannot explain to you
why my guesses about the terms of hypothetical contracts made by L in
an unreal frictionless world ought to determine L's real world fate. But
somehow I do believe that it is important to know how much V and L
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might be willing to compensate one another for the losses the law may
impose upon them. Don't you agree?
B. Toward Law and Economics
To be sure, activist lawyers reply, but we cannot appraise the legal
value of economic efficiency until we press the conversation far beyond the
point to which the applied economist is prepared to carry it. Quite simply,
American lawyers emerge from a cultural tradition very different from the
scientistic positivism that shaped the present orthodoxy in welfare eco-
nomics. Far from declaring questions of value meaningless, lawyers aim to
present the most persuasive normative account that the facts of a case and
the legal materials will allow. Instead of encouraging a search for a couple
of unproblematic intuitions that will solve all problems of value, their tra-
dition teaches them that simple solutions are invariably simple-minded,
that their first and most important duty is to confront the complexity of
legal dilemmas in a self-conscious and disciplined way, that the process of
debating and refining the issues is no less important than the substantive
values that are shaped and reshaped in the resulting public dialogue.
Within this cultural context, using economic efficiency as a talisman for
mature legal evaluation will inevitably seem woefully naive, no matter
how sensible it seemed to hardheaded economists struggling to find a place
for value in their positivist subculture.
The weight of the legal tradition will not, however, restrain all lawyers
from aping the applied-economics talk familiar on the other side of the
disciplinary boundary separating law from economics. Just as some true
believers simplify their Coasean statement of the facts by refusing to take
pervasive market failure seriously, so too they may simplify their state-
ments of value by trivializing anything that cannot be reduced to economic
efficiency. It is this reductionism, of course, that accounts for so much of
Chicago's legal notoriety.59
Before such a rhetorical strategy can possibly succeed, however, Ameri-
59. It is a sign of the power of the legal culture, however, that trivialization does not come as
easily to Chicago lawyers as it does to Chicago economists. Thus, while thousands of applied econo-
mists are content to use cost-benefit analysis in their practical activity, it was only an efficiency-
minded lawyer like Richard Posner who thought himself obliged to defend economic efficiency in
philosophical terms. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-115 (1981). Not that Posner's
effort was particularly successful. Devastating critiques of his work include Coleman, The Normative
Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1982); Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Kronman,
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980). My point is, rather,
that Posner remained enough of a lawyer to see that an elaborate normative defense was a conversa-
tional necessity before he could reasonably hope to convince his legal audience of the validity of his
approach. In contrast, equally thoughtful Chicagoans who were interested in speaking principally to
economists, rather than lawyers, persist in speaking about values in the crudest possible positivistic
terms. See Becker & Stigler, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977).
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can law must be transformed by a political revolution equal in force to,
but opposite in direction from, the one whose consequences upon the legal
mind this Symposium is investigating. Begin with the epic struggle be-
tween New Deal and Old Court that signals the constitutional triumph of
the activist state. Since the fall of Lochner v. New York,60 American law-
yers have been taught to distrust the very analogy upon which the welfare
economist builds his normative certainties. Where the applied economist
begins with the dogmatic assertion of the unproblematic character of
Pareto-superior contracts, the fate of Lochner cautions lawyers against
placing any great weight on the abstract value of freedom of contract.
Where the applied economist seeks to identify the contractor who would
pay the most for the disputed legal right in a world of perfect markets,
Lochner teaches us the legal folly of equating market efficiency with social
justice.
To make matters worse for the Chicagoan, there is Brown v. Board of
Education.61 While every lawyer must make his peace with Lochner, the
terms of this accommodation may be framed negatively: thou shalt not
imagine that perfected market justice is all there is to American law. In
contrast, Brown forces lawyers to come to terms with an affirmative value
before they can claim an understanding of the deepest aspirations of our
existing legal system. Yet when lawyers turn to the welfare economics
literature, they will search in vain for an effort to reconcile economic effi-
ciency with any conception of equality. Nor will they be much comforted
when they turn from the writings of professional economists to those of
economically-minded lawyers who hope for an unproblematic translation
of efficiency-talk into the law. When Richard Posner, for example, was
pressed to explain the evil of slavery, the best he could do was to assure us
that, so long as the dollar value of our labor as free persons is higher than
our dollar value as slaves, we have nothing to fear from the great god
Efficiency!"
Yet Judge Posner has done us all a service in explicitly advancing such
a trivializing account of the evil of slavery. For his example should shock
us into recognizing that, so long as Brown remains on the books, lawyers
cannot accept the notion that judgments about "efficiency" are somehow
less controversial than judgments about "distribution." Within our legal
culture, it seems far less controversial to say that slavery is wrong because
it denies each person's fundamental right to equal respect, than to say that
it is wrong only if it is inefficient. Rather than serving as an alternative to
60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
62. R. POSNER, supra note 59, at 111; Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin
and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAl. STUD. 243, 246-47 (1980).
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"distributional" judgments, "efficiency" is just one way of talking about
the distribution of costs and benefits imposed by the legal system, and an
obviously inadequate way of making sense of our existing legal system.
While the applied economist's analogy to perfected bargains might suffice
to satisfy the cognitive needs of a profession operating against a bleak
positivist background, it cannot serve as a conversation-stopper for law-
yers operating against a deeply entrenched tradition of public dialogue
about individual rights and social justice. The poverty of welfare econom-
ics is especially apparent when one considers that Lochner's insistence on
the bargain principle threatened to destroy the standing tradition of legal
discourse, while Brown's affirmation of equality marked the greatest tri-
umph of legality in recent American history."
C. The Search for Liberal Foundations
In rejecting Posnerism, however, I hardly wish to encourage a profes-
sional relapse into familiar Realist musings upon the inevitable distortion
and inhumanity of abstract legal thinking." To the contrary: When we
try to do justice in a Constructive way, focusing upon systemic failure no
less than on individual deviance, it is not enough to react intuitively to
particular features of individual cases. We must also distinguish the idio-
syncratic from the systemic aspects of the facts displayed before us, and
frame our legal response in the light of the structural, as well as individ-
ual, injustices that the case may exemplify.65 Where the Chicagoans have
gone wrong is in the way they propose to stuff the legal vacuum left by
the disintegration of Realistic situation sense. In relying so heavily on the
discourse of applied economics to define the aims of activist law, they have
produced a positivist parody of Constructive legal thought.
63. These arguments, it should be emphasized, are entirely independent of the Chicago School's
effort to establish the economic efficiency of the common law. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 416-
17, 439-41. I myself find this effort entirely unpersuasive, for reasons developed by Rizzo, The Mi-
rage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641 (1980), and Priest, Selective Characteristics, supra note 5,
among others, For present purposes, however, the substantive merit of the efficiency hypothesis as a
descriptive account of the common law is secondary to the odd legal methodology employed by the
Chicagoans. If one is interested in understanding the values expressed by existing American law, the
place to begin is not with the "common law" but with the Constitution and governing activist legisla-
tion-for if these sources express ideals inconsistent with common law, every competent lawyer knows
that constitutional and statutory values trump judge-made law in a democratic system like our own.
Yet not even the hardiest Chicagoan would suggest that our statutory and constitutional law displays
a single-minded devotion to efficiency. It is this point that serves as the crux of the critique advanced
in the text.
64. See supra p. 1096.
65. To forestall predictable misunderstanding, I do not believe that idiosyncrasy never counts, or
that the assessment of individual responsibility for deviant actions has no place in a mature system of
activist law. As I emphasized earlier, see supra pp. 1088-94, one of the activist's principal preoccupa-
tions will be the effort to reconcile his concerns for social justice with his abiding commitment to
principles of individual responsibility. Indeed, it has been a principal aim of my own work to present
such a framework. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 57, at 180-86, 327-48.
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Yet even parodies have their value, if only to emphasize what Construc-
tive lawyers cannot afford to ignore if they hope to remain faithful to their
own historical traditions. Unlike the applied economist, we cannot reduce
legal conversation to a guessing game about the ex ante bargains the par-
ties might have reached in a frictionless Coasean world. Instead, freedom
of contract makes legal sense for us only within an institutional frame-
work that guarantees individual contractors a fair share of economic
power no less than political and civil rights. It is only a theory that locates
market freedom within this larger legitimating framework that can possi-
bly provide a general interpretive framework for understanding existing
American law.
1.
It is this recognition, I think, that accounts for the resonant chord
struck by John Rawls' Theory of Justice'6 in American law schools.
Rather than using hypothetical contract as a way of begging the question
of the legitimate sphere of market freedom, Rawls uses the idea to put the
market in its place. The trick, as we all know, is to place hypothetical
contractors behind a thick "veil of ignorance," and explore the ways in
which they will seek to cope with the uncertainties generated by unfet-
tered market exchange. Such a thought-experiment, Rawls says, will re-
veal that competitive markets are acceptable only when controlled by an
activist legal system that promotes the ongoing redistribution of economic
power to the worst-off class, and guarantees civil and political liberties to
all classes. Given this conclusion, it should be no surprise that Rawls was
just the thing Constructive lawyers needed as an antidote to the abuse of
applied economics. He not only provided a framework for understanding
the distinctive legal structures of the American activist state, he did so in a
way that encouraged lawyers to reflect upon, rather than suppress, the
relationship between activist legal structures and principles of legitimacy
deeply entrenched in the tradition of Western liberalism.
The Rawlsian contribution to Constructivist argument was equally im-
portant on a more technical level. Rather than celebrating the effort to
ground value judgments on highly fact-dependent intuitions, Rawls takes
a very un-Realistic path to the meaning of social justice in an activist
state. 67 On his view, insight into our more particular intuitions will come
only if we look upon them from an "original position" in which we are
deprived of all concrete facts about our particular society. No reader of A
Theory of Justice, moreover, could fail to be impressed by the way in
66. J. RAWLS, supra note 55.
67. I know of no textual indication that Rawls himself has ever seriously considered American
Legal Realism in the development of his own positions.
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which the use of a veil of ignorance can indeed transform one's prior intu-
itions about the nature of social justice."' This transformation, in turn,
raises deeper questions about the Constructive enterprise. Precisely be-
cause the veil of ignorance provides a disciplined way to examine initial
intuitions, it is important to examine Rawls' black box with a good deal of
care. Does the Rawlsian construction serve as an appropriate test of one's
initial intuitions? If so, why? If not, might we design a different thought-
experiment that would serve as a legitimate test?
Rawls' answer to these Constructive questions resonated deeply within
our own legal tradition. His effort to reinvigorate the metaphor of a social
contract had obvious connections to the historical foundations of American
constitutionalism. Was not the Republic born amidst talk of social con-
tract and individual rights? Was it not peculiarly satisfying, moreover, to
put freedom of contract in its place by a complex meditation on the meta-
phor of contract itself?
Despite its many attractions, however, I think it would be a mistake for
the profession to succumb to the image of a social contract in its ongoing
effort to articulate the legal foundations of our activist state. Not that the
rising forms of Constructive argument ought to deny the normative signif-
icance of contract, both actual and hypothetical, in the just resolution of a
host of disputes. Nonetheless, I want to deny that bargaining metaphors
ultimately do justice to our collective pursuit of activist legitimacy. Instead
of defining activist justice by escaping to a never-never land that lies be-
hind a veil of ignorance, Americans have another, better, way of defining
the basic terms of activist legitimacy.
It is nothing other than the process of legal disputation itself. When
Americans think they have been deprived of their rights, they characteris-
tically express their grievances in legal terms-and insist that courts, no
less than legislatures, take their demands for justice seriously. The benefi-
ciaries of the status quo, moreover, are not free to ignore their fellow
citizens' legal grievances. They must frame-on pain of a default judg-
ment-a legally acceptable response to the question of legitimacy: What
gives you, rather than me, the right to resources we both seek to enjoy?
Just as defendants cannot respond by ignoring the plaintiff's question,
so too they are not free to rationalize their position by offering any and
every reason that might conceivably legitimate their legal position. In-
stead, each legal culture should be-conceived as a vast conversational filter
that allows only a small fraction of possible justifications to make their
68. For a thoughtful statement of the Rawlsian position, see Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilib-
rium and Theory Acceptance ir Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256 (1979). For even stronger critiques of intui-
tionism as an appropriate form of evaluation, see B. ACKERMAN, supra note 57, at 349-78; R. HARE,
MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT (1981).
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way into the legal conversation provoked by the question of legitimacy. It
is this legally constrained conversation that provides the cultural context to
which Americans, throughout their history, have resorted in their effort to
articulate the basic nature of their rights against, and duties toward, one
another. And it is by reflecting upon the appropriate structure of the
ongoing legal conversation, rather than in speculating upon the terms of
hypothetical social contracts, that Constructive lawyers may be of the
greatest service to their fellow citizens.
Two features of the ongoing process of legal dialogue should be of par-
ticular importance in the emerging Constructive understanding. The first
is the comprehensive legal questioning characteristic of an activist polity.
Rather than presuming the sanctity of the distribution of power generated
by the basic institutions-contract, property, family, market-thrown up
by the invisible hand, the activist lawyer recognizes that any citizen disad-
vantaged by the status quo may appropriately question the legitimacy of
existing arrangements. To put the point in more familiar doctrinal lan-
guage, my first principle of activist justice-comprehensive legal dia-
logue-can be viewed as a generalization of the idea of procedural due
process. Whenever any person finds any of his substantial interests
blocked by the legal protection of the interests of competing citizens, he
has a prima facie right to demand a hearing at which he is provided with
some reason explaining why the law is protecting others at his expense.6'
And yet, while activist lawyers insist upon comprehensiveness, they also
recognize the dangers involved in opening up all power structures to legal
questioning. Once established power structures are stripped of their pre-
sumptively legitimate status, how is the law to check a political elite from
using a momentary electoral victory as a mandate for the totalitarian over-
haul of our basic institutions?70 The question's importance, moreover, is
only emphasized by the weakening of the old ways in which lawyers im-
posed conversational discipline upon the exercise of power. For, as we
have seen,71 many of the traditional features of lawyerly discourse-its
69. While this principle has been compromised around the edges during the past decade of Burger
Court adjudication, even conservative commentators have doubted whether these ad hoc limitations
will stand up against the force of precedent built up over the course of the past century. See
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 432-34 (1977). In any event,
my argument does not depend on the precise contours of the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Quite apart from the Constitution, the tendency toward comprehensive legal dialogue is expressed in
countless statutes, not to speak of daily bureaucratic and judicial practice. While exceptions to the
general rule do of course exist, and may even be constitutionally tolerated, this should not be allowed
to conceal the central role played by comprehensive legal dialogue in the contemporary American
understanding of the legitimation process. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a
Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Pro-
cedural Due Process, 18 NOMOS 126 (1977).
70. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (J. Madison).
71. See supra pp. 1086-88.
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focus on institutionalized expectations, individual deviance, party control,
lay adjudication, finality of judgment-were organized around the contin-
uing vitality of the reactive constraint, and can no longer be confidently
relied upon to restrain the uses of activist power.
Far from yearning for the return of a (non-existent) Golden Age of
reactive constraint, my own vision of Constructive lawyering is one in
which the comprehensive questioning of ongoing power relationships is
carried out under two constraints that prohibit totalitarian transforma-
tions. These principles of Neutrality, developed in my book on Social Jus-
tice in the Liberal State, 2 are rooted in two core elements of our liberal
constitutional tradition. The first principle, a generalization of the estab-
lishment clause,7" forbids citizens from justifying their legal rights by as-
serting the possession of an insight into the moral universe intrinsically
superior to that of their fellows. The second principle, an interpretation of
the equal protection clause, 4 forbids the legal recognition of any right
that requires its holders to justify its possession by declaring themselves
intrinsically superior to their fellow citizens. If I am to be believed, more-
over, the outcome of this constrained legal conversation will be neither a
blanket endorsement of market efficiency, regardless of the inegalitarian
distribution of power upon which the market is based, nor a simplistic
repudiation of the ideal of free exchange, merely because it inevitably up-
sets any static egalitarian pattern. Instead, the upshot of this liberal legal
dialogue will be the conditional affirmation of market freedom-
conditional on the effective recognition of each citizen's right to enter the
marketplace with a liberal education and a fair share of economic power.
It is only within this basic structure of undominated equality 5 that the
concerns of an efficiency-minded lawyer with the reduction of transaction
costs and the perfection of botched bargains can take on legal value. In a
world like our own, scarred by deeply entrenched patterns of poverty, ra-
cism, and sexism, this means that lawyer-economists cannot blandly as-
sume that the activist state is merely concerned with the perfection of the
market structures thrown up by the invisible hand. Instead, they also must
do justice to the collective aspiration to establish the social preconditions
for the liberal legitimacy of the market system.
In short, instead of disciplining the activist state by an appeal to hypo-
72. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 57.
73. See Kurand, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961)
(neutrality as organizing principle of religion clauses).
74. See Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP.
CT. REV. 127 (equal protection prohibits state from declaring one citizen intrinsically superior to
another).
75. The concept of undominated equality is elaborated at length in B. ACKERMAN, supra note 57,
at 3-192.
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thetical contract, I aim to mediate ongoing political conflict through a le-
gal culture in which public values are developed in the manner of Ameri-
can law, with adversaries arguing out the merits of their claims under
certain fundamental conversational constraints deeply entrenched within
our legal tradition. Any effort to use efficiency-talk to blot out this dimen-
sion of our legal culture must be seen for what it is, a revolutionary effort
to blind Americans to a vital element of their standing tradition.
2.
This is not the place, though, to try to persuade you of the merits of
liberal dialogue as a method of disciplining the burgeoning powers of the
activist state. Indeed, it will take a generation of argument before we can
begin to clarify the stakes involved in adopting one, rather than another,
competing legal Construction of the pursuit of justice in an activist liberal
polity. Rather than immediate clarity, the short-term prospect is the
proliferation of competing Constructions.7 ' For surely the notions of social
contract and liberal dialogue do not exhaust the fund of legitimating ideas
available to Americans seeking to make sense of their legal situation. At
the very least, we may expect creative efforts to rehabilitate the utilitarian
tradition that has been so unfairly eclipsed by the recent orgy of effi-
ciency-talk. There is no reason, though, for us to content ourselves with
the resurrection of older philosophies. Few nations in history have ever
76. See Dworkin, What Is Equality? (pts. 1 & 2), 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 283 (1981). Like
Rawls and me, Dworkin seeks, first, to reject utilitarian solutions to the problem of justice and, sec-
ond, to reconcile market exchange with an underlying commitment to equality in the initial distribu-
tion of material wealth. In his work thus far, however, Dworkin has contented himself with an elabo-
rate description of the particular egalitarian-cum-market scheme he favors. What is required, in
addition, is an effort to justify Dworkin's particular conception of distributive justice in a way that
illuminates its relationship to fundamental elements of the liberal tradition. Nor will it do for Dwor-
kin to proclaim that his favorite egalitarian-cum-market scheme is supported by the American com-
mitment to Equality of Respect, and leave the matter at that. The fact is that there are millions of
Americans out there who will at first deny that equality of respect implies initial equality in material
endowments, and will insist instead that a proper conception of liberty or community or family is
inconsistent with Dworkin's egalitarian ipse dixits. The challenge is to explain to such people why the
principles of activist political legitimacy they do accept should lead them, upon reflection, to adopt
egalitarian principles in areas, such as material distribution, that they initially believe should be gov-
erned by different principles. It is precisely this task that Rawls and I have set ourselves-by showing
how larger conceptions of liberal political legitimacy, based on social contract and liberal dialogue
respectively, serve to define the rightful place of material equality and market freedom in a just soci-
ety. Until Dworkin tries to locate his own egalitarian-cum-market scheme within a larger theory of
political legitimacy, it is hard for me to tell how deep our differences go on particular doctrinal issues.
It is clear enough, however, that we are of the same mind on one of the main points that he
addresses: rather than measuring equality in terms of each citizen's subjective sense of his own per-
sonal welfare, liberal principles should lead to a focus upon each citizen's initial share of material
resources. While, in my view, this conclusion falls out of more fundamental arguments, see B. ACKER-
MAN, supra note 57, at 45-59; Ackerman, What Is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 ETHICS 372, 377-
83 (1983), it is useful to learn that this emphasis on material wealth, rather than psychic welfare, can
be supported by Dworkin's more intuitionistic approach.
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embarked upon such a large and complex effort to reconcile the competing
claims of social justice and individual freedom. Fewer still have survived a
half-century without suppressing one value in the name of the other. The
practical experience we gain from our successes and failures pushes us
onward to a deeper understanding of the legitimating principles of liberal
activism.
As our Constructive legal experience deepens and expands over time,
moreover, there is every reason to expect that critical legal commentary
upon it will proceed apace. Present signs indicate that these exercises in
"deviationist legal doctrine""7 will take at least two forms-one communi-
tarian,7 8 the other libertarian.7 9 These rival efforts to prepare the way for
radically different legal futures will converge upon a single critical truth:
that the activist liberal present is incoherent and that the effort to build a
Constructive legal understanding on such a makeshift foundation is bound
to fail. Whatever else it may accomplish, this ongoing critique should
serve to fuel the main line of legal activity. The best way to motivate
Constructive legal work is to paint pictures of the brave new worlds that
may follow the failure of our present enterprise in liberal activism.
I have no doubt, moreover, that liberal activists have much to learn
from a serious dialogue with their critics. After all, if we are to redeem
the promise of the New Deal, American lawyers can blind themselves to
neither the libertarian nor the communitarian visions of our dissenting
legal brethren. The challenge instead is to grasp both of our critics' half-
truths at the same time, and build the legal foundations of a world where
the affirmation of individual freedom does not conceal the pervasive reality
of social injustice, where the affirmation of communal responsibility en-
riches the significance of personal liberty.
Not that a vigorous and constructive legal dialogue can ever hope to
77. I borrow the term from Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV.
563, 576 (1983).
78. The most significant theoretical work here is R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975),
which bears a most problematic relationship to the more applied writings associated with the Critical
Legal Studies movement, including Unger, supra note 77. Compare, for example, Unger's effort in
Knowledge and Politics to establish the incoherence of liberalism, R. UNGER, supra, at 1-144, with his
advocacy of "super-liberalism" in his more recent movement writings, Unger, supra note 77, at 602.
If Unger now wishes "to remake social life in the image of liberal politics," id., surely he owes us a
clear explanation of the extent to which, and the reasons why, he has abandoned his prior judgment
finding liberalism philosophically bankrupt.
79. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) is the laissez-faire manifesto that is most
visible to contemporary American lawyers. I myself, however, have gotten more out of F. HAYEK,
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (vol. 1 (1973); vol. 2 (1976); vol. 3 (1979)) and M. OAKESHOTT, ON
HUMAN CONDUCT (1975). For serious legal critiques of activist state premises, see C. FRIED, supra
note 10; R. EPSTEIN, supra note 24; Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, 92 YALE L.J.
(1983) (forthcoming). While Fried is more prone to profess support for activist conceptions of distrib-
utive justice than is Epstein, I myself believe that there is less of a difference between them than meets
the eye. See Ackerman, On Getting What We Don't Deserve, 1 J. SOC. PHIL. & POL. 60 (1983).
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compensate for an apathetic and muddled political debate. Yet the reverse
is also true: political commitment is no substitute for legal deliberation.
While the future of America depends on the American people, the future
of American law depends, in a special way, on us.
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